2026年欧洲宏观展望：韧性与刚性

EuropeMacro Outlook2026Resilience vs. rigidity MarkWallIManagingDirectorChief EuropeanEconomist July2026 EuroArea MacroOutlook:Summary Framing:‘Two-economy'problem Pre-conflict:Europeaneconomy caughtbetweencyclicalresilienceand structural rigidity Resilience: Despite external headwinds (tariffs, etc), GDP exceeded expectations at 1.5% in 2025 - robust domestic demandRigidity: The world is changing and Europe needs to invest/innovate/reform to gain competitiveness and autonomyGerman fiscal easing expected to underpin growth resilience in 2026 - H1 impulse proved slower than expected Middle East conflict nowunwinding,andthequestion is:howrapid a recovery? GDP growth 0.5% in 2026 (1.1% pre-conflict est.), HICP 2.8% (1.8% pre-conflict est.) - assuming peace deal by end-JuneOil price moderating more rapidly than expected - economy still subdued by shock - some indirect inflation inevitable‘Measured'ECB tightening (5Obp): good risk management between upside inflation risk and downside growth risk Weak competitiveness-economicallyand geopolitically-EU in need of strategicautonomy,progressisslow Defence spending will inevitably need to rise further as Europe builds own deterrence capabilities - even with Ukraine peaceGreater autonomy also needed in energy, technology (including Al), supply chains, financing, payments, etcSignificant investment is needed - high public indebtedness and political fragmentation are hurdles - CMU would help DBForecasts:EuroAreaMacroViews WorldOutlook2026:Anythingbutdull 2026 promised to be anything but dull. It is living up to expectations: the extraction of President Maduro from Venezuela, theAl/Tech sector correction, threats to Greenland, private credit tensions, overturning of the IEEPA tariffs, and war in Iran with a newenergy shock. Even if geopolitics quietens, Al is likely to come back and dominate market sentiment and drive boom-and-bustnarratives. Europe's""two-economyproblem":Resiliencevs.Rigidity external headwinds, thanks to a robust labour market, effective monetary transmission, etc. Germany's expansionary fiscal policywas expected to add resilience in 2026. The more downbeat perspective emphasizes Europe's 'rigidity' We are in a rapidlychanging world marked by geostrategic economic competition. Europe should be innovating, investing, reforming - and is findingthis difficult. EuroAreaMacroForecasts:lnflationup,growthdown conflict) and 1.1% in 2027 (1.3% pre-conflict). We forecast HICP inflation at 3.1% in 2026 (1.8% pre-conflict) and 2.5% in 2027 (1.9%pre-conflict). Our forecasts were based on an assumption of a US-lran peace deal by end-June followed by a gradual moderation ofenergy prices (oil to avg USD80/bbl in 2027). Oil prices have fallen more rapidly than we were expecting - which means downsiderisk for inflation and upside risk for growth IranShock:EnergypricesvsECBbaselineandalternativescenarios The global economy, and Europe, is in a highly contingent situation. The path of economies and policy will be a function of energyprices. The ECB has developed a baseline scenario and 3 alternative scenarios: mild, adverse and severe. Gas prices are very closeto the ECB's baseline scenario. Since the US-lran peace deal was announced, oil prices have fallen below the ECB baseline, but arestill above the mild scenario. Energyshockisunwinding-slowlyMiddleEastcrisislowered2026GDPgrowthto0.5%(from1.1%)-post-MOUoutlookstartingtoimprove...slowly Primary transmission channels for energy shock: real income shock, uncertainty shock, global growth shockReal income shock reversing: cumulative 2026-2027 inflation shock was c.2pp, now c.1.2pp - adds a few tenths to '26 GDPGlobal growth resilient but uncertainty not falling yet, business and household confidence only tentatively recovering Shock amplifiers are fading Europe was able to secure more supply of jet fuel - some concern that EU gas storage could be low going into winterLabour market sentiment had weakened more sharply than in 2022 - actual activity still holding upBank credit shows a gap between expected conditions (tight BLS) and actual conditions (easy credit impulse) Tailwinds and headwinds Two-sidedrisks Tailwinds: Al spending/global manufacturing cycle; German fiscal spending & reforms; Ukraine peaceHeadwinds: Competitiveness and China Shock 2.O; Trump/NATO/Greenland/digital tariffs; elections (including France) EuroAreaInflation:Allabouttheriskofpost-energyshockpersistence Pricing Power Indirecteffects:Surveyshaveindicatedpass-through,butthecostimpulseisstartingtofade-cappingupsiderisk PMl data showed an especially strong pass-through from input costs into output prices in AprilRate of pass-through eased in May and costs pressures started to reverse in June - lower oil implies bigger cost drop in JulyDelivery times tightened through the Middle East crisis - can be an inflation shock amplifier - needs monitoring Bargaining Power Labour market not has tight as 2022, but not normal either -