美国《国际紧急经济权力法》关税问答：不确定性持续

Issuer of report:HSBC Bank plcView HSBC Global Research at:https://www.research.hsbc.comListen to our insightsFind out moreHSBC Global Research PodcastsJanet HenryGlobal Chief EconomistHSBC Bank plcjanet.henry@hsbcib.com+44 20 7991 6711EconomicsGlobal ◆◆◆ President Trump does have other options for delivering tariffs, including those already used onthe sector-specific front,but such Section 232 and 201 tariffs involve a more time-consumingprocess of consultation before duties could beimposed.Onequestion therefore is whether theadministration could use Section 122as a stop-gapshould they need to.Q5. Couldthe USuse Section 122 to impose universal tariffs for a period?ThePresident has consistently presented the case for tariffs as a source of US governmentrevenue. So,ifthe CIT rulingholds through the appeal process,itis unlikelyto prompt achangeincourse.There isone existing (but hitherto never used) piece of legislation–Section 122 ofthe Trade Actof 1974–thatcould potentially be used to levy temporary tariffs of up to 15% onall imports to address balance of payments deficits. Unlike the sector tariffs, a consultationperiod would not be required, but the universal application of Section 122 tariffs on all countriesmakes them less useful as a lever in trade negotiations with individual countries. Importantly,they can only be imposed for a maximum of 150 days. Theycould, however, potentially be usedas a stop-gap measure if the final ruling upholds the CIT ruling. The lattercould mean theadministration opts to try to push legislation through Congress to approve auniversal tariff of10-15% (i.e.through the MFN schedule).But, as with any Section 122 tariffs, a universal tariffon all imports from all countries means that the threat of much higher tariffs cannot be used as anegotiating tactic.1.The Trump administration’s emergency tariffs had started to bring in revenuesSource: Bloomberg, US Customs and Border Protection. Note October 1 2024 through April 30 2025.. IEEPA tariffs took effect gradually in February-April 2025Q6.What does thepotential tariff revenue loss mean for the BBBreconciliation package?For now the tariffs remain in place.In terms of the amount of revenue that could be delivered bytariffs,chart 1 shows the amounts raised inthe seven months from October 2024 to April 2025.Section 301 tariffs on imports from China continued to make by far the largest contribution tototal trade duties, but the initial IEEPA tariffs only started to take effect on Mexico, Canada andChina in February 2025 and on other countries in April. Looking at the latest monthly data forApril,it was USD16bn,so if we simply multiply these by 12 for simplicity (although in reality ithinges on what happens to import volumes),tariff revenueis on track tomore than doubletonearly USD200bnfrom the less than USD80bn collected annually in 2023-2024if the tariffsremain in place.If there is a loss of tariff revenues,it will haveno direct implications for theso-calledBigBeautiful BillActas there wasnoexplicit connection to tariffrevenuesin the Republican budgetreconciliation packagethat has just passed through the House of Representatives. That bill nowgoes to the Senate. Even so,Republican Senators will not simply accept the package that waspassed by the Houseandhave two months from today (prior to the “August recess”) to argueabout various details in the House package. Importantly, if the Senate makes any changes atall, then the House will have to vote on the new package, again. Our USeconomistestimates05101520250510152025IEEPA (Canada)IEEPA (10% Reciprocal)IEEPA (Mexico)IEEPA (China)Secton 201 (Solar products)Secton 232 (Aluminum)Section 232 (Automobiles)Section 232 (Steel)Section 301 (China products)Duties collected in fiscal year 2025USDbn about a60% probabilitythebill isall wrappedup before the August recess and a 40%probability that it becomes messier and drags into September and beyond.Given the timeline, this means there will be a reluctance to put tariffs into the budgetreconciliation bill at such a late stage,but, if theadministrationis intent on implementinguniversal tariffs through legislation, the reconciliation process would appear to be the only viableoption asneither Congressional Republicans, nor the public, are united about the virtues oftariffs and thereis unlikely to be anyDemocrat support for tariffs.Q7.Will other countries be in less of a hurry toreach bilateral trade deals with the US?Not really. With reciprocal tariffshaving been ruled asunlawful, the urgency with whichsomecountries may feel the need to strike a bilateral dealcouldbea littlelower. Despitethe reprieve,the tariffs are still in place andenormous reciprocal tariffs stillpotentiallyloomafter the 9 Julydeadlineif the courts rule against the CIT ruling.Soforthe most part,we think bilateral talks willcontinue and, for some countries, at pace.Uncertainty regarding US trade policy is as uncertain as ever.With or without the CIT ruling, thevarious potential cours