稳定币的宏观经济学

by Boris Hofmann, Matthias Kaldorf and Matthias Rottner Monetary and Economic Department June 2026 JEL classification: E42, E43, G12, G23, G28 Keywords:stablecoins,macroeconomicmodel,regulation, credit supply, fiscal policy, monetary policy BISWorking Papers are written by members of the Monetary and EconomicDepartment of the Bank for International Settlements, and from time to time by othereconomists, and are published by the Bank. The papers are on subjects of topical This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). The Macroeconomics of Stablecoins Boris HofmannBISMatthias KaldorfDeutsche BundesbankMatthias Rottner June 23, 2026 Abstract We analyse the macroeconomic impact of stablecoins using a quantitative macroe-conomic model. Stablecoins influence the economy through two opposing channels:(i) a bank lending channel, as household demand for stablecoins raises deposit rates,increases bank funding costs, and reduces loan supply; and (ii) a fiscal space chan-nel, as stablecoin issuers’ demand for Treasury bills lowers sovereign borrowing costs,expands fiscal space for tax reductions or higher spending. Calibrated to the U.S., Keywords: Stablecoins, Macroeconomic Model, Regulation, Credit Supply, Fiscal JEL Classification: E42, E43, G12, G23, G28. 1Introduction Stablecoins, cryptoasset tokens that are pegged to a reference asset, in most cases the US dollar,are the dominant means of exchange in the crypto ecosystem.Their market capitalisationhas grown significantly over recent years and is forecast to expand further, albeit the range of forecasts is wide (Figure 1).Against this background, a growing literature has analyzed the In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by analysing the macroeconomic effects of stablecoinsin a new quantitative macroeconomic model calibrated to the United States.We introducestablecoins into a macroeconomic framework that combines elements from the macro-finance The analysis suggests that stablecoin adoption affects the economy through two main chan-nels, which we denote as the bank lending channel and the fiscal space channel. The bank lendingchannel operates through banks’ deposit funding and credit supply, while the fiscal space chan- on the regulatory design of stablecoins, the source of stablecoin demand, and fiscal conditions.The model also implies that the fiscal space channel operates more quickly during the transition We introduce stablecoins by assuming that households derive utility benefits from holdingthem, but we leave their valuation of bank deposits and cash constant throughout the analysis. Stablecoins thus serve as an alternative savings and transactions vehicle for households andcompete with physical cash and bank deposits. Consistent with current regulatory frameworksand proposals, stablecoins are unremunerated.At the same time, they provide liquidity and safety benefits beyond their nominal return. As a result, widespread stablecoin adoption is asso-ciated with a decline in demand for bank deposits, lowering the liquidity premium banks obtain The fiscal space channel arises because stablecoin issuers’ demand for Treasury bills lowerssovereign borrowing costs, expanding fiscal space to reduce taxes or increase spending. In linewith current reserve asset allocations of major stablecoins, stablecoin issuers in the model hold inthe baseline scenario risk-free short-term government bonds (Treasury bills). Hence, widespreadstablecoin adoption raises the demand for T-bills.The associated decline in the short-term We calibrate the model to annual U.S. macro-financial data and stablecoin adoption scenariosbased on the industry projection ranges displayed in Figure 1. Specifically, we consider adoptionlevels between 1 and 3 trillion USD, corresponding to up to 40% of current T-bills outstanding.In our baseline stablecoin specification, we further assume that stablecoin demand originatesdomestically and that stablecoin issuers exclusively invest in short-term government bonds. We Our model predicts that a substantial increase in stablecoin adoption to 2 trillion USD would lower output by around 0.03% in the long run. The reason for this output contraction is thatthe bank lending channel of stablecoins dominates the fiscal space channel. The credit supplycontraction in the banking sector is not fully offset by the increase in fiscal space. This quanti-tatively modest response reflects several offsetting balance sheet adjustments. First, householdssubstitute into stablecoins not only out of deposits but also out of cash, which reduces the directdisintermediation of the banking sector. Second, banks reduce their T-bill holdings, which off- This output-based assessment may understate the potential welfare benefits of stablecoins.Households derive utility from holding liquid assets, reflecting liquidity, transaction, and safetyservices beyond their financial return (Sidrauski, 1967; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990).In ourframework, liqui