利用301条款报复欧盟歧视性政策的案例

MEREDITH BROADBENT, RODRIGO BALBONTIN, JOSEPH V. CONIGLIO,AND STEPHEN EZELL|JUNE 2026 The EU has an array of discriminatory policies that target major U.S. tech firms, a legitimatebasis for action under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. U.S. policymakers should favoramicably negotiated solutions, but this tool is available as a last resort if necessary. KEY TAKEAWAYS EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) operates as a discriminatory, extractive regulatory regimeaimed at America’s biggest technology companies, giving the United States a strong case Section 301 offers far more remedies than just tariffs, including also provisions fortargeted retaliation and other actions that can help push trading partners to remove The United States should use the threat of a possible Section 301 case against the DMAas a tool of pressure and negotiation, not as an excuse to trigger a broader trade war The DMA matters not only because of its direct effects in Europe, but also because it isencouraging copycat digital regulations in other countries that could multiply the damage There are asymmetries in how the United States treats European companies and viceversa—European technology firms have long operated freely in the U.S. market. The right U.S. strategy should make clear that discriminatory digital regulation carriesconsequences while still leaving room for a negotiated solution with Europe. CONTENTS Key Takeaways................................................................................................................... 1Introduction....................................................................................................................... 3Overview of the Digital Markets Act ...................................................................................... 4The Power of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 .............................................................. 6Section 301: A Tool for Confronting Discrimination Under the DMA ........................................ 8Fair Market Access: A Key to U.S. and European Tech Competitiveness................................ 8How the U.S. Trade Reset Is Turning to Section 301 as a Preferred Tool .............................. 9The EU’s DMA as a Section 301 Violation .......................................................................... 13De Jure Discrimination and the DMA............................................................................... 13The Cost of the DMA on American Firms ......................................................................... 14Mapping the Activities of European Technology Companies in the United States .................... 16European Companies Enjoy Economic Freedom in America That U.S. TechnologyCompanies Do Not Enjoy in the EU................................................................................. 16Main EU Technology Companies With Unfettered Activities in the United States ................. 16 INTRODUCTION The transatlantic alliance constitutes a central pillar for both the United States and Europe. Butalliances do not imply acquiescence. When one partner adopts rules that disproportionatelyburden the other’s leading firms—especially in sectors central to economic and technological That is the situation that has now emerged in the European Union, for example, with the DigitalMarkets Act (DMA). Regulation is legitimate when it is neutral, evidence based, proportionate,and grounded in sound economics. It becomes a trade problem when it functions as adiscriminatory tool. The European Union has every right to regulate digital markets—however The DMA represents a discriminatory policy against U.S. companies, and its model has beenreplicated in other jurisdictions. Although framed as a competition law for large digital“gatekeepers,” the DMA applies in practice overwhelmingly to American companies. Five of theseven designated gatekeepers are U.S. firms, and U.S. firms’ products account for nearly alldesignated core platform services. The law imposes sweeping obligations, product-design The DMA represents a discriminatory policy against U.S. companies, and its model has beenreplicated in other jurisdictions. Although framed as a competition law for large digital “gatekeepers,” The United States should increase pressure on Europe, through diplomacy and tradenegotiations, and move to an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ifdiplomatic engagement fails to remedy the issue. Properly used, Section 301 provides a tool forleverage, evidence-building, and a formal determination regarding unfair and discriminatory This dispute is among friends and allies, and it should be resolved as such. To be clear, thepreferred outcome is a negotiated solution that preserves the broader U.S.-EU relationship whilecorrecting the DMA’s discriminatory effects. But such an outcome would require the EU to On December 16, 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) posted a