关税报复的设计与效果：来自欧盟的证据

International Finance Discussion Papers ISSN 1073-2500 (Print)ISSN 2767-4509 (Online) Number 1436 March 2026 The Design and Effect of Tariff Retaliation: Evidence from the European Union Ece Fisgin, Johannes Fleck, Keith Richards Please cite this paper as:Fisgin, Ece, Johannes Fleck, Keith Richards (2026).“The Design and Effect of Tar-iffRetaliation:Evidencefrom the European Union,”International Finance Discus-sion Papers 1436.Washington:Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,https://doi.org/10.17016/IFDP.2026.1436. NOTE: International Finance Discussion Papers (IFDPs) are preliminary materials circulated to stimu-late discussion and critical comment.The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors anddo not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors. Referencesin publications to the International Finance Discussion Papers Series (other than acknowledgement) shouldbe cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers. Recent IFDPs are availableon the Web at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/. This paper can be downloaded without charge from theSocial Science Research Network electronic library at www.ssrn.com. The Design and Effect of Tariff Retaliation: Evidence from the European Union* Ece Fisgin†Johannes Fleck‡Keith Richards§ March 16, 2026 Abstract We show that the EU’s 2018 retaliation against US steel and aluminum tariffs targeted goodswith low US import dependence and high substitutability.For the majority of tariffedgoods, the US share of EU imports declined notably and remained below pre-2018 lev-els even after the retaliatory tariffs were lifted, reflecting asymmetric effects of tariffs ontrade diversion. Moreover, although the retaliatory tariffs were instantly and fully passedthrough to EU importers, the retaliation did not lead to domestic price pressures as we findno evidence for inflationary effects on consumer and producer prices. Keywords:Trade Wars, Retaliatory Tariffs, Tariff Pass-Through, Inflation, US-EU TradeRelations JEL Classification: E31, F13, F14, F42, F62 1Introduction The recent sharp US tariff hikes represent a historic departure from the decades-long trend ofglobal trade liberalization. In response to such tariff increases, it is natural to ask what the ef-fects of foreign retaliation might be. While there were retaliatory threats from other economiesearly on during the current and ongoing episode, they largely eased, partly in response to bilat-eral trade deals. But these truces are fragile as the deals are often incomplete and commitmentsuncertain, most notably regarding foreign investment pledges.More generally, if there wasa breakdown of the global trading order due to ever-stronger protectionist policies, it wouldlikely result in substantial retaliation. Despite this rising relevance of tariff retaliation, there is only scant evidence regarding its im-pact on the retaliating economies. Indeed, the focal point of the recent literature on the effectsof tariffs is their impact on the US economy. This evidence is not informative about potentialretaliation and its effects on the retaliator. Moreover, the design of retaliatory tariffs can takemany shapes. Therefore, understanding the effects of retaliation on the retaliator necessarilyrequires examining particular episodes of retaliation. Our paper closes this gap in the literature by assessing the trade destruction and domesticprice effects of the European Union’s (EU) 2018 tariff retaliation package. This package wascompliant with World Trade Organization (WTO) provisions and represented a “rebalancing”response to US steel and aluminum tariffs.Between June 2018 and January 2022, it applied10 and 25 percent ad-valorem duties on a $3.3bn list of US imports ranging from steel andaluminum to consumer goods like bourbon, motorcycles, and apparel. With this selection ofproducts, the EU sought to minimize domestic economic disruptions while maximizing pres-sure on the US to rescind the steel and aluminum tariffs. Standard trade theory suggests that the incidence of tariffs, whether they are borne by exportersthrough lower pre-tariff prices or by importers through higher post-tariff prices, depends onthe relative, product-specific elasticities of supply and demand. Hence, if the EU’s demand forthe tariffed US imports was inelastic, or if EU importers could not easily find substitutes, eitherfrom domestic or third-country suppliers, the retaliatory tariffs would have materialized as atax on European businesses and consumers, resulting in inflationary pressures. We assess thesemechanisms from an empirical perspective by studying the evolution of import quantities andprices of tariffed and non-tariffed products in a difference-in-difference framework. Our key findings are as follows: First, the retaliatory tariffs had a lasting destructive effect on US imports to the EU. The import value of the tariffed products fell to ab