法国核计划的教训（英）

ROBIN GASTER | SEPTEMBER 2025 France has embarked on an ambitious program to build at least six new large nuclear reactors,applying lessons from recent overruns and delays. While success is far from guaranteed, there are KEY TAKEAWAYS A U.S. nuclear strategy must have strong bipartisan support. Nuclear designs often takedecades, and private investors need certainty. We cannot afford to change the strategy The United States cannot and should not replicate France’s highly centralizedgovernment structure and dependence on EDF as a single national champion for energy. Existing fragmented government structures—both inside and beyond DOE—must besystematically reorganized into a coherent and consistent whole that is able to demand A large order book is the key to cost reduction—but will be hard to build in the UnitedStates, where other sources of energy are highly competitive, there is no national security France is highly focused on large reactors, but that is a historical legacy, not a well-grounded strategy. U.S. advantages in SMRs could offer a much better alternative. Construction support can be provided through federal loans at cost, but further de-riskingis needed to encourage private investment in extremely long-range and high-risk projects. The U.S. model of providing tax credits as effectively indefinite operating subsidies isflawed. There are better alternatives that connect energy sources to the market more itif.org CONTENTS Key Takeaways ................................................................................................................. 1Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3Flamanville 3: A Financial and Policy Disaster ..................................................................... 4The Prototype Penalty .................................................................................................... 4A New Workforce ........................................................................................................... 4Construction Failures ..................................................................................................... 5Organizational Chaos...................................................................................................... 5Financial Catastrophe and Future Implications.................................................................. 5EPR2: Faster and Cheaper?................................................................................................ 6Simplified Design .......................................................................................................... 6New Financial Structure ................................................................................................. 7 INTRODUCTION The Trump administration has moved quickly to supercharge development in the U.S. nuclearsector. The White House issued series of executive orders this spring seeking to accelerate reactor licensing and testing, amp up domestic nuclear fuel production, and add 300 gigawattsof new nuclear capacity by 2050, among other short- and long-term goals.1The orders are part ofthe administration’s effort to ensure an abundant, reliable, and affordable energy supply that canmeet increasing demands from AI and the broader U.S. economy. Against this backdrop,takeaways from France’s long experience in the nuclear sector will be invaluable, particularly as Macron’s speech addressed four strategic problems: rising energy costs, climate concerns, thereplacement of French nuclear plants built in the 1980s, and the need for more energy asFrance electrifies and data centers proliferate. The war in the Ukraine had also begun only weeksbefore the speech, and Europe was understandably panicked about its overreliance on naturalgas from Russia. Nuclear was framed as essential for European strategic autonomy, a way to But EPR2 is not just more reactors; it’s an effort to learn from previous failures and to developan industry that can deliver large reactors on time and on budget, using more buildable nucleardesigns, better project management, and improved oversight. EPR2 is partly a reaction to theprevious Flamanville 3 project, which began in 2007 but ballooned from an original estimate of Macron’s nuclear plans have prevailed (so far) despite significant domestic opposition.Environmental groups and left-wing parties have argued, wrongly, that nuclear expansion is acostly distraction from renewable energy development, and some are still fundamentallyantinuclear. Following Macron’s 2022 re-election, the French political landscape has been veryunstable. Parliamentary elections in July 2024 led to a hung parliament, and a succession of To understand EPR2 and its possible lessons for the United States, we must start with thepast—specifically, with the Flamanville 3 reactor. Much of EPR2 is an explicit effort to learn the Key lessons inc