您的浏览器禁用了JavaScript(一种计算机语言,用以实现您与网页的交互),请解除该禁用,或者联系我们。[WTO]:2025全球贸易展望与统计报告 - 发现报告

2025全球贸易展望与统计报告

2025-04-23-WTO杜***
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2025全球贸易展望与统计报告

Global Trade Outlookand Statistics April 2025 About the WTO The World Trade Organization is the international body dealingwith the global rules of trade between nations. Its main functionis to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freelyas possible, with a level playing field for all its members. Disclaimer This publication has been prepared under the WTO Secretariat’s own responsibility.It does not necessarily reflect the positions or opinions of WTO members and iswithout prejudice to their rights and obligations under the WTO agreements. Theopinions expressed and arguments employed herein are not intended to provide anyauthoritative or legal interpretation of the provisions of the WTO agreements andshall in no way be read or understood to have any legal implications whatsoever. The terms and illustrations used in this publication do not constitute or imply anexpression of opinion by the WTO Secretariat concerning the status or boundariesof any territory. Acknowledgements This report was prepared under the leadership of Ralph Ossa, WTO ChiefEconomist and Director of the Economic Research and Statistics Division.LeadcontributorswereColemanNee,BarbaraD’AndreaAdrian,EddyBekkers, Michael Blanga-Gubbay and Marc Auboin. Additional contributionsthrough statistical production, modelling or drafting were provided by ShradhaBhatia, Lori Chang, Fabio Della Coletta, Florian Eberth, Lee Humphreys,Hryhorii Kalachyhin, Tinotenda Mataire, Donal Smith and Ying Yan. The Information and External Relations Division provided valuable support onthe production of the report. Contents 1.Executive summary2 Outlook for world trade in 2025 and 2026 Merchandise trade3Commercial services trade9Trade-related indicators16 3.Drivers of trade and output17 4.Fragmentation of world trade20 5.Analytical chapter: Modelling trade policy uncertaintyand changes in tariffs 22 6.Appendix tables31 Appendix Table 1:31Leading exporters and importers in world merchandise trade, 2024 Appendix Table 2:32Leading exporters and importers in world merchandise trade excludingintra-EU trade, 2024 Appendix Table 3:33Leading exporters and importers of commercial services, 2024 Appendix Table 4:34Leading exporters and importers of commercial services excludingintra-EU trade, 2024 Appendix Table 5:35Leading exporters and importers of digitally delivered services, 2024 Executive summary •The outlook for global trade has deteriorated sharply due to a surge in tariffs and trade policyuncertainty (TPU). Based on measures in place as of 14 April, including the suspension of “reciprocaltariffs” by the United States, the volume of world merchandise trade is now expected to decline by0.2% in 2025 before posting a modest recovery of 2.5% in 2026. The new estimate for 2025 is nearlythree percentage points lower than it would have been without recent policy shifts, and marks asignificant reversal from the start of the year, when WTO economists expected to see continued tradeexpansion supported by improving macroeconomic conditions. •Risks to the forecast include the implementation of the currently suspended reciprocal tariffs bythe United States, as well as a broader spillover of trade policy uncertainty beyond US-linked traderelationships. If enacted, reciprocal tariffs would reduce world merchandise trade growth by anadditional 0.6 percentage points, posing particular risks for least-developed countries (LDCs), while aspreading of TPU would shave off a further 0.8 percentage points. Taken together, the reciprocal tariffsand spreading TPU would lead to a 1.5% decline in world merchandise trade volume in 2025. •The impact of recent trade policy changes varies sharply across regions. In the adjusted forecast,North America now subtracts 1.7 percentage points from global merchandise trade growth in 2025,turning the overall figure negative. Asia and Europe continue to contribute positively but less thanin the baseline scenario, with Asia’s contribution halved to 0.6 percentage points. The combinedcontribution of other regions – Africa, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), includingcertain associate and former member states, the Middle East, and South and Central America and theCaribbean – also declines but remains positive. •The disruption in US-China trade is expected to trigger significant trade diversion, raising concernsamong third markets about increased competition from China. Chinese merchandise exports areprojected to rise by 4% to 9% across all regions outside North America as trade is redirected. At thesame time, US imports from China are expected to fall sharply in sectors such as textiles, apparel andelectrical equipment, creating new export opportunities for other suppliers able to fill the gap. This couldopen the door for some least-developed countries (LDCs) to increase their exports to the US market. •Services trade, though not directly subject to tariffs, is also expected to be adversely affected. Tariff-indu