外汇干预的政治经济学

The Political Economy of Kodjovi M. Eklou WP/26/130 progress by the author(s) and are published toelicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are 2026JUN IMF Working Paper Asia and Pacific Department The Political Economy of Foreign Exchange Interventions Authorized for distribution by Lamin Leigh IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the ABSTRACT:Exchange rate movements have implications for the purchasing power of residents or voters. Giventhat the exchange rate is often seen as a barometer of government performance, there could be strong incentivesto influence exchange rate valuation during elections. This paper investigates whether political economy factorsaffect Foreign Exchange Intervention (FXI) policy across countries. It investigates whether central banks tend toimplement FX sales, leaning against depreciations, during electoral periods in a sample of 28 countries includingboth advanced (AEs) and emerging (EMs) economies over the period 2000-2019. The results show that EMs WORKING PAPERS The Political Economy of Foreign Prepared byKodjovi M. Eklou Contents A.Data......................................................................................................................................................5B.Stylized Facts.......................................................................................................................................7II.The Political Economy of Foreign Exchange Intervention: Empirical Analysis......................................8 A.Empirical Strategy................................................................................................................................8B.Results and Policy Discussions..........................................................................................................10 BOXESNo table of figures entries found. FIGURESNo table of figures entries found. TABLESNo table of figures entries found. Introduction The merit of an independent central bank, that is a central bank that can implement policies without politicalinterference is well established. However, in practice,de factocentral bank independence ischallengingbecausecentral bank governors are often politically appointed andthe policy ofcentralbanksaffects the aggregateeconomy performance, for which,onlypoliticians may be held(electorally)accountable2. For instance, recent In this paper, we investigate whether political economy factors influence the implementation of Foreign ExchangeIntervention (FXI) policies. Previous evidence showsthat governments tend to maintain appreciated currenciesbefore elections, delaying a depreciation/devaluation until after the election (Klein and Marion 1997; Frieden,Ghezzi, and Stein 2001)because depreciation-induced reduction in national purchasing power are politically Using monthly data covering 28 countries including bothadvanced (AEs) and emerging (EMs) economies overthe period 2000-2019, the paper finds evidence oflarger and more frequentFX salesin pre-electoral periodscompared to post-election periods. This result is driven byEMswith competitive electionsandwhere politicalpressureson central bank governors areplausiblymore prevalent.The findings suggest therefore that centralbanks in these EMs tend to lean against depreciations in pre-electoral periods which could preserve or boost thepurchasing power of voters. Indeed, the exchange rate is such an important price that politicians may wish to Thispaper provides novel findings on electoral cycle in FXI policy.These findings have important policyimplicationsgiven that politically motivated FX sales could hamper the ability of central banks to effectivelyrespond to large shocksif reserves are depleted to temporary boost voters’purchasing power.The results pointto specific areas where improvement in transparency could help mitigate or curb electorally driven FX sales.Improvingmonetary policy transparency,specifically in the areas of economic,policy and operationaltransparency could contribute to dampen the influence of political pressures on FX sales.First,inpractice, In addition, in the context of the old debateon rule vs discretion and the issue of time inconsistency of optimalmonetary policy (Kydland and Prescott 1977, Calvo 1978), there could be room for FX policy intervention rulesto curb potential pressures on central banks to draw down on reserves duringelectoral periods.6 Morespecifically, for instance setting a predetermined range or threshold for exchange rate depreciations, could makeFXI policies more transparent and thus mitigate political pressures.7Further, these rules could beguidedmorebroadlybythe use cases of FXI as outlined in the Fund’sIntegrated Policy Framework-Principles for Use of The paper is related to the literature on the political economy of exc