日本货币政策观察：鹰派解读下的首次鸽派转向

MPM review: an initial dovishinterpretation Kentaro Koyama, Ph.D. A dissenting vote suggests a more dovish policy boardThe rate hike was approved by a 7-1 vote, with the dissenting vote cast by board Chief Economist member Asada, who was appointed by Prime Minister Takaichi and joined theboard just this March. Although we had noted this possibility in our preview memo,it was not our main scenario. It is highly unusual for a board member to express This action has significant implications for the future composition of the policyboard. It is conceivable that the new member, Sato, scheduled to join in June, mayalso adopt a dovish voting stance. Furthermore, looking ahead to July 2027, the Why a 50bp hike was not on the tableIn the concurrently released " Economic Activity and Prices in Japan: Current Situation and Outlook" (the mini Outlook Report), board members Tamura andTakata dissented on the price outlook, as they did with the April Outlook Report.Their reasoning was that underlying inflation has already reached the "pricestability target," a view unchanged from their previous dissent. This was not a The rate hike path implied by the revised forward guidanceThe revision to the forward guidance, which we expected would be aimed at securing future policy flexibility, materialized in a different form than anticipated.Specifically, the phrase " real interest rates are at significantly low levels" from the This change aligns with the conclusions of the BoJ's March BoJ review paper,"Developments in the Natural Rate of Interest and the Assessment of the Degree ofMonetary Accommodation". It suggests a shift away from using direct benchmarks 16 June 2026Japan Monetary Policy Watch accommodative financial conditions. However, since the indicators for judgingwhether "financial conditions are accommodative" are diverse, this gives the BoJgreater discretion. In our preview memo, we had anticipated a more substantial revision to theguidance, but the wording chosen this time is simpler. Nevertheless, it will takeconsiderable time to determine if financial conditions remain "accommodative"even after a rate hike. This can be taken as an implicit message that the BoJ is not Furthermore, if economic conditions consistent with the price stability target areachievedfrom October 2026 onwards,as the BoJ forecasts,it would beinconsistent for financial conditions to be described as accommodative rather than We maintain our rate hike forecastConsidering the revised forward guidance and the addition of the phrase "there is a risk of underlying CPI inflation deviating upward to a level above the price stabilitytarget of 2 percent" to the statement, we see no need to change our forecast for anaccelerated pace of rate hikes. We continue to expect the next rate hike inOctober, On the other hand, the scenario of raising the policy rate to 2% at a pace of roughlyonce every six months, which some in the market have priced in, now faces a higher Outright purchases of JGBs: a conspicuously cautious exitRegarding outright purchases of JGBs, the BoJ decided to maintain its tapering plan through the 1Q 2027, after which it will maintain monthly purchases at around2 trillion yen from April 2027. This means the tapering of JGB purchases will What we find problematic, however, is the justification provided. This time,"improvement of market functioning and stability" was explicitly stated as anobjective of JGB purchase operations. While "market stability" was mentioned asa goal for flexible operations at the June 2025 meeting, incorporating both "market As we pointed out in our preview memo, we understand that opinions calling for ahalt to the reduction of purchases were in the minority at the prior "Bond Market Asymmetry with other policy tools raises accountability questionsThe BoJ's cautious stance on reducing its JGB holdings becomes even more pronounced when compared with its handling of other policy tools. For example, the terms for the "Funds-Supplying Operations to Support an Increasein Lending" (the special lending facility) were tightened in March 2024, and inJanuary 2025 it was decided that new lending would cease at the end of June 2025.This was executed swiftly without public consultation forums akin to the bondmarket meetings. As a result, the outstanding balance of 71 trillion yen as of June Meanwhile, for ETFs, the BoJ announced at its September 2025 meeting a policyto sell them off over a period of more than 100 years. The significant differences inthe methods and pace of unwinding for each policy tool have not been adequately Appendix 1 Important Disclosures *Other information available upon request *Prices are current as of the end of the previous trading session unless otherwise indicated and are sourced from localexchanges via Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors . Other information is sourced from Deutsche Bank, subject companies,and other sources. For further information regarding disclosures rel