2026年中东战争对全球经济的影响（英）

Warwick J. McKibbin,Marcus Noland, and Geoffrey ShuetrimJune 2026 ABSTRACT This paper explores two scenarios for the potential economic effects ofa Middle East war that causes a spike in energy prices. In the first, oilprices surge for one year to around $120 per barrel, while prices alsorise sharply for liquefied natural gas, refined petroleum, and fertilizer:in the second, energy prices remain elevated for three years. We findin both scenarios, global growth slows relative to our baseline Warwick J. McKibbinis nonresidentsenior fellow at the Marcus Nolandis executive vicepresident and Geoffrey Shuetrim,is chief technologyofficer atMcKibbin Software JEL codes:C6, F51, Q34, Q43.Keywords:Iran, Middle East, oil prices, war Acknowledgments:We thank Jing Yan for technical support, and ChadBown, Nick Lardy, and Ángel Ubide for helpful comments on a preliminarydraft. McKibbin’s contribution to this study was supported by the On February 28, 2026, Israel and the United States launchedan attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran. One Iranian responsewas to close the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow passageway throughthe Persian Gulf through which approximately 20 percent of theworld’s oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) transits. While both Saudi Oil prices have been volatile, rising and falling on rumors ofpeace or renewed conflict. The price, which had been $73 per barrel(Brent crude) before the war, peaked at $138 in early April (figure 1). The price of nitrogen fertilizer, which uses oil and natural gas asfeedstocks, has risen by 30–50 percent, depending on the product Higher fertilizer costs are expected to adversely impact foodproduction. Energy-intensive activities, such as data centeroperations and the processing of critical minerals, could also be If hostilities were to cease and the Strait reopened to shipping,prices could return to more normal levels relatively quickly.3But other scenarios are more concerning. Available reservesare not large relative to the world market, and there are limitedopportunities to bring more supply online from producers outside 1https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/urea.2JP Morgan on March 13 assumed $100 per barrel. Two weeks later,on March 30, Bloomberg (2026) commented: “US governmentofficials and Wall Street analysts are starting to consider theprospect that oil prices might surge to an unprecedented $200 perbarrel.”3Hendrix (2026) provides estimates of normalization times: spot that Iran was able to close the Strait may create a persistent, if notpermanent, risk premium on shipping transiting the Strait, even Other studies have explored a range of scenarios. TheInternational Monetary Fund’s (IMF) April World Economic Outlook(WEO) explored three scenarios. A “reference scenario” assumesthat war-related economic disruptions fade by the middle of2026 and that oil prices average about $82 per barrel in 2026. An An even more sustained energy shock is conceivable, as arguedby Darren Lim (2026). After the initial stage of bombing, theclosure of the Strait of Hormuz has meant that the war is unlikely toend without negotiation. Violence offers no effective solutions oneither side in this specific situation. Both sides view events so far asvictories for themselves, so their capacity to accept a negotiated In this paper, we examine two alternative scenarios for theconflict’s impact on the global economy that differ in the durationof supply disruption. The scenarios start with crude oil at $72 per •A one-year disruption in which oil prices surge 66 percent to rise 75 percent, and agricultural productivity falls 3 percent due •A three-year disruption with the same 2026 disruption as in thefirst scenario, but with an additional shock in 2027 half the size We find that even a temporary shock exerts a drag on the globaleconomy. But the income and inflation effects vary considerablyacross regions, depending on central banks’ responses, thedependence on endowments of energy, economic structures,reliance on energy from the Middle East, and spillover effects onproduction networks within and across countries. We assumecentral banks follow a Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor style rule5and We also ignore any policy responses that attempt to offsetthe price effects through changes in energy subsidies in differentcountries. US GDP is projected to be slightly more than 1 percent MODELING THE IMPACT OF THE WAR Recent empirical work has sought to identify and quantify themacroeconomic effects of geopolitical oil price shocks using high-frequency and econometric approaches. Verduzco-Bustos andZanetti (2026) develop a novel instrumental-variable strategy The analysis in this paper is complementary but methodologicallydistinct. While Verduzco-Bustos and Zanetti (2026) identify shocksfrom historical data, we impose explicit, forward-looking scenarioswithin a structural multi-country model (G-Cubed) to trace the To understand the implications of the war on the globaleconomy, we use the G-Cube