极端高温的经济成本

28 May 2026 Content Page 3-4Executive Summary Page 5-12The economic transmission of heat stress Page 13-16The macroeconomic implications of heat stress Page 17-19The fiscal burden Page 20-23From exposure to resilience: the three-pillaradaptation plan Page 24-26Appendix SummaryExecutive •Extreme heat is emerging as a structural economic risk, with Europe highly exposed.Heat stress events have multiplied sevenfold since the 1980s while the averagedeath toll per event has risen fivefold. That share partly reflects measurement: vitalregistration and excess-mortality surveillance are far more developed in Europe than inmuch of Africa and South Asia, where heat deaths go largely uncounted. But genuinestructural vulnerability is also at work – ageing populations, dense urban building stockdesigned to retain warmth and severely underdeveloped cooling infrastructure, with air-conditioning penetration averaging 19% across Europe against roughly 90% in the US. Hazem KricheneSenior Economist, Climatehazem.krichene@allianz.com Bjoern GriesbachHead of Macroeconomic & CapitalMarkets Researchbjoern.griesbach@allianz.com •The economic transmission of heat stress is non-linear, with a critical thresholdaround 30°C beyond which productivity losses intensify sharply.Below this level,warming reduces heating costs and is associated with modest productivity gains. Abovethis level, the relationship reverses and both channels worsen with each additionaldegree. The dominant effect operates through labor: output per hour declinesby approximately USD1.3 (constant PPP, ~3% of mean hourly output in our 2014-2024 sample) for every degree across the 30-35°C range. Wage adjustments followproductivity with a lag, so the short-run cost falls disproportionately on firm profitabilitybefore gradually transmitting to household income and consumption. A second, smallerchannel runs through energy: consumption rises by around 1.2% per degree, raisingfirms‘ input costs at exactly the temperatures where labor productivity is falling. Jasmin GröschlSenior Economist for Europejasmin.groeschl@allianz.com •To gauge the macroeconomic stakes, we construct a stress scenario in which thefive hottest years observed in each country between 2014 and 2024 are replayedin ascending order over 2026–2030 – the fifth-hottest year in 2026, the fourth in2027 and so on, culminating in the country‘s hottest year on record in 2030.Underthis trajectory, cumulative implied GDP losses (2026 – 2030) could reach 5–7% for themost exposed economies: USD240bn for France, USD354bn for Japan, USD147bnfor Italy, USD131bn for Germany and USD120bn for Spain. More consequentially forlong-run growth, in such a scenario the decline in fixed capital formation systematicallyexceeds consumption losses, reaching 8% on average across affected countries:As heat compresses expected returns on capital, investment falls, reducing futureproductive capacity in a self-reinforcing drag. Moreover, stagflationary dynamics shouldbe expected, with rising prices alongside rising unemployment, placing monetaryauthorities in a binding trade-off that is especially acute in the Eurozone, where a singlepolicy rate must serve economies with sharply diverging climate exposures. Katharina UtermoehlHead of Thematic and Policy Researchkatharina.utermoehl@allianz.com Jade ElisabethResearch Assistantjade.elisabeth@allianz.com •The fiscal consequences fall most heavily on the economies least able to absorbthem.The loss of economic output due to heat reduces tax revenues: Estimated annuallosses would reach 1.8% in France, 1.3% in Italy and Spain and 0.7% in Germany – partlybecause progressive tax systems mean revenues tend to fall faster than output itself,amplifying the fiscal drag beyond the headline GDP loss. Simultaneously inflation-indexed transfers, healthcare costs and emergency infrastructure repair raises public expenditure. Fiscal balances deteriorate by around 0.5% of GDP annually on average.Italy and Spain risk breaching the Maastricht deficit ceiling (again) once heat-relatedpressures are incorporated. France, already carrying a projected deficit of −4.9% of GDP,faces additional heat-related pressure of 2.2%. •Insured losses remain a small fraction of total damages, reflecting a structuralmismatch between what heat destroys and what conventional insurance wasdesigned to cover.In 2022, total climatological losses in Europe reached EUR46bnwhile the insured share rose only marginally. Most heat damage accumulates throughexcess mortality, lost working hours, healthcare-system pressure and infrastructurestress – channels that indemnity contracts are not designed to handle. This makesextreme heat harder to insure than other climate risks because losses are widespreadand are often indirect – like lower productivity or health impacts – making them difficultto measure and price. Closing the protection gap is therefore as much a product-designchallenge as a capacity one, and the insurance toolkit