同行压力：相对债务如何推动新兴市场主权利差

Peer Pressure:HowRelative Debt DrivesEmerging MarketSovereign Spreads Carmen Avila-Yiptong,Georges Hatcherian, Mahamoud Islam WP/26/110 IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progressby the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers arethose of the author(s) and do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,or IMF management. 2026JUN IMF Working PaperAfrican Department Peer Pressure: How Relative Debt Drives Emerging Market Sovereign SpreadsPrepared byCarmen Avila-Yiptong, Georges Hatcherian, Mahamoud Islam Authorized for distribution byJesmin Rahman andAmadou SyJune2026 IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT:This paper shows that sovereign bond spreads are shaped not only by absolute debt levels butalso by a country’s relative debt position within its peer group. Using panelfixed effects for over 80 emergingand developing economies over 1993-2024, we find that relative debt—especially benchmarked by income andcommodity status—has greater explanatory power for spreads than gross debt alone. A one–standarddeviation increase in relative debt raises spreads by roughly 0.2–0.3 standard deviations, comparable inmagnitude to global risk indicators. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in relative debt is associated with a 3.8percent increase in sovereign spreads, all else equal. The effect of relative debt is state-dependent, beingstronger in countries with better institutions, access to concessional lending, and during periods of low riskaversion and ample global liquidity. These results hold across alternative specifications, sample periods,methodologies, and controls, which underscores the comparative nature of investor assessments and theimportance of benchmarking for fiscal policy, debt management, and international surveillance. RECOMMENDED CITATION:Avila-Yiptong, C., Hatcherian, G., Islam, M. (2026).Peer Pressure: HowRelative Debt Drives Emerging Market Sovereign Spreads(IMF Working Paper No.26/110). InternationalMonetary Fund. Contents Contents...............................................................................................................................................................1Introduction.........................................................................................................................................................2Literature Review................................................................................................................................................3Theoretical Intuition and Conceptual Framework............................................................................................4Stylized Facts......................................................................................................................................................5Data and Methodology........................................................................................................................................8Data................................................................................................................................................................8Methodology and Empirical Strategy..............................................................................................................9Baseline Results...............................................................................................................................................10Relevance of Relative Debt..........................................................................................................................10When Does Relative Debt Matter?...............................................................................................................13Alternative Measures and Robustness Checks.............................................................................................16Alternative Specifications of Relative Debt...................................................................................................16Robustness Checks.....................................................................................................................................17Conclusion.........................................................................................................................................................25References.........................................................................................................................................................27Annex.................................................................................................................................................................29Annex I. Peer Gr