欧尔班制裁后的匈牙利，贸易和能源影响

Sanctions,Trade and Energy Implications 14 April 2026 On 12 April 2026, the voters in Hungary showedtheir support for the Tisza Party, led by PéterMagyar, handing it approximately 138 of the 199seats in the National Assembly on a turnout ofsome 77.8%, ending the sixteen-year tenure ofPrime Minister Viktor Orbán.1Orbán telephoned Sanctions Policy and EU Financial Support Even though the outgoing government is often described as acategorical opponent of EU sanctions on Russia, its record isin fact more selective. Hungary blocked the 20th package noton ideological grounds but because Hungarian diplomacy hadtied it to the January 2026 interruption of oil flows through The incoming prime minister’s position on the EU’s €90 billionloan to Ukraine shows both the character and the limits of thischange. At his first press conference, on 13 April, Magyar saidthat Hungary would not block the loan but would preserve theopt-out negotiated under Orban in December 2025, by whichHungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic would The practical questions for operators, however, are narrower.They concern the Hungarian vote on EU sanctions againstthe Russia, the fate of the €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine, thecontinuation of Russian crude imports through the Druzhbapipeline, the course of the Paks II nuclear project, and the be exempt from any financial contribution therein.4Energy Supply and Structural DependencyEnergy policy is the area in which the gap between symbolicchange and structural continuity is expected to be most stark.The southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline has carried noRussian crude to the MOL refinery at Százhalombatta since27 January 2026, following damage to the pipeline in westernUkraine variously attributed to Ukrainian drone operationsor to Russian strikes. Independent analysis concludes thatthe Adria pipeline, operated by Croatia’s JANAF, can coverthe combined requirements of Hungary and the SlovakRepublic, though Budapest has disputed this. Magyar hassaid that any government led by him would continue to buycrude from Russia and would not hesitate to use any EU The Transition of Power and Its Procedural Preliminary results from Nemzeti Választási Iroda (the NationalElection Office) give Tisza approximately 53.6% of the voteand Fidesz-KDNP approximately 37.8%, on the highestturnout recorded since the restoration of free elections in1990. With such a mandate, the incoming administrationcould theoretically amend Magyarország Alaptörvénye (theFundamental Law of Hungary) and related statutes governingthe judiciary, the Prosecution Service, the National Bank, the State Audit Office and the Budget Council. Although theFundamental Law allows for inauguration of a new primeminister to be dragged out until 12 May 2026, Magyar haspublicly stated that he hopes to be installed in his new postby 5 May. Under the Fundamental Law, the president of the Trade Policy and European Parliament How Can We Help As a global firm with a deep-rooted international trade andsanctions practice, we are actively advising clients on theregulatory shifts following the recent change of governmentin Hungary. Our team assesses counterparty exposure underboth the EU and the US sanctions regimes, with a particularfocus on the flow of Russian crude and refined products, The voting record of the Tisza delegation in the EuropeanParliament is a reliable guide to the stance that a Tiszagovernment might adopt moving forward. In the past, theirdelegation has cooperated with its European partners onsanctions-related matters but has also forcefully defendedHungarian sovereignty on matters of trade and on attemptsto widen the EU’s competencies. It repeatedly voted againstthe EU-Mercosur agreement, so much so that the European In the energy sector, we can guide developers and financiersthrough the 2028 gas prohibition, the transition of the crudesupply from the Druzhba to the Adria pipeline, and thecomplexities of the Paks II supply chain. We can also providecounsel on governance matters, including the recovery of Although the new government will probably cease to serve asChina’s veto on the Council on questions of EU trade defence,the industrial commitments at Szeged and at Debrecen, now Contacts US Secondary Sanctions José María ViñalsPartner, Madrid | Brussels | GenevaT +34 91 426 4840M +34 649 133 822E josemaria.vinals@squirepb.com In November 2025, President Trump granted Hungary anexemption from the secondary effects of US sanctionsagainst Rosneft and Lukoil. That exemption will expire in orabout November 2026, within the first six months of thenew government.7The case for extension does not rest onthe Orbán relationship. A Tisza government stands closer tothe stated Ukraine-pressure objectives of the administration Tigran PiruzyanSenior Associate, MadridT +34 618 017 354E tigran.piruzyan@squirepb.com Guillermo Giralda FustesAssociate and Public Policy Advisor,BrusselsT +322 627 7621 Expectations Several dates wil