马来西亚：选定问题

MALAYSIA SELECTED ISSUES February 2026 This paperonMalaysiawas prepared by a staff team of the International Monetary Fundas background documentation for the periodic consultation with the member country. It Copies of this report are available to the public from International Monetary Fund•Publication ServicesPO Box 92780•Washington, D.C. 20090Telephone: (202) 623-7430•Fax: (202) 623-7201E-mail:publications@imf.org Web:http://www.imf.org International Monetary Fund MALAYSIA SELECTED ISSUES February 4, 2026 Approved ByAsia and Pacific Prepared BySandile HlatshwayoandAishwary Trivedi(APD) CONTENTS UNPACKING THE EFFECTS OF TRADE POLICY UNCERTAINTY ON ASEANECONOMIES __________________________________________________________________________ 3 A. Introduction__________________________________________________________________________3B. Granular TPU Measures: Methodology & Stylized Facts______________________________5C. Empirical Methodology ____________________________________________________________ 10D. Empirical Results ___________________________________________________________________ 12E. Conclusion _________________________________________________________________________ 19References____________________________________________________________________________ 20 FIGURES1.Own Trade Policy Uncertainty, By Type and Region________________________________8 2.ASEAN6 Own Trade Policy Uncertainty, By Type: 1995 to 2025 ____________________93.ASEAN6 Third-Party Trade Policy Uncertainty, By Type: 1995 to 2024 _____________94.Impact of TPU Shocks on Real GDP Per Capita___________________________________ 135.Impacts of Third-Party TPU Shocks on Real GDP Per Capita Across Percentiles ofTrade Openness _________________________________________________________________ 146.Impact of TPU Shocks on Real GDP Per Capita: Dual-Shock Specifications_______ 15 TABLES1.Examples of Malaysia’s Trade Policy Uncertainty Measures Across Type and Geography ________________________________________________________________________52.Own Trade Policy Uncertainty Sample Statistics, by Type and Region______________8 MALAYSIA ANNEXESI.Alternative Trade Policy Uncertainty Term Sets ___________________________________ 22 II.Trade Policy Uncertainty Algorithms – Additional Methodological Detail_________ 23III.Additional Stylized Facts__________________________________________________________ 25IV.Empirical Methodology and Data Annex__________________________________________ 26 UNPACKING THE EFFECTS OF TRADE POLICY Trade policy uncertainty (TPU) has reached record highs in recent years. To better understand itseffects, this paper develops granular TPU measures for several ASEAN economies that distinguishbetween protectionist and trade agreement-based uncertainty, as well as differences between ‘own’-country TPU shocks and third-party TPU shocks (i.e., spillovers from TPU in trading partnereconomies). The results indicate that third-party protectionist TPU shocks are the most detrimental tooutput per capita, followed by third-party agreement TPU shocks and own protectionist TPU shocks.For third-party TPU shocks, declines in investment and private consumption disproportionately offset A.Introduction Trade policy uncertainty (TPU) has recently reached historic highs, with an expansiveliterature suggesting it has negative implications for growth in ASEAN economies and beyond.2At a macro-level, the literature finds that higher TPU leads to poor economic outcomesincluding sluggish investment and low productivity growth, as well as puzzles like the disconnectbetween changes in real effective exchange rates (REER) and export performance (Caldara et al.,2020; Handley & Limao, 2015; Hlatshwayo & Saxegaard, 2016; Zhou & Ji, 2022). At the micro-level, 2.However, the existing literature may miss important variation in the effect of varioustypes of TPU.3Baker et al.’s (2016) ‘news-chatter’ trade policy uncertainty measure uses counts ofarticles where the term set includes phrases that relate to both uncertainty stemming fromprotectionism and uncertainty related to trade agreements (e.g., the WTO), as well as broadergovernment subsidies (see Annex I for this and the below mentioned term sets). The inclusion ofbroader government subsidies may dilute the trade-focused aspect of their measure since subsidies 3.Theory suggests TPU shocks can have both positive and negative effects on economicoutcomes.Under real options theory, in an environment with rising policy uncertainty and in thepresence of fixed and irreversible costs, the benefit of delaying decisions (‘waiting and seeing’) rises,hindering investment, hiring, and firm performance (e.g., Bernanke, 1983; Baldwin & Krugman, 1989;Rodrik, 1991; and Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).4Risk premia theories highlight that higher policyuncertainty raises the cost of borrowing given that the probability of bad outcomes increases andinvestor confidence is negatively affected (Bloom, 2014). In contrast, the