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保留工作计划的福利影响(英)

金融 2026-01-01 国际货币基金组织 张博卿
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The Welfare Implicationsof Job Retention Schemes John Bluedorn, Jorge Mondragon, Ippei Shibata,Marina M. Tavares WP/26/15 IMF Working Papersdescribe research inprogress by the author(s) and are published toelicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers arethose of the author(s) and do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,or IMF management. 2026JAN IMF Working Paper Research Department The Welfare Implications of Job Retention Schemes Prepared by John Bluedorn, Jorge Mondragon, Ippei Shibata, and Marina M. Tavares Authorized for distribution by Florence JaumotteJanuary 2026 IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT:This paper examines the welfare implications of job retention schemes, where governmentssubsidize employers to preserve jobs during downturns. Using EU microdata from 2003 to 2018, we show thatsuch schemes are associated with lower job separation rates, especially among lower-productivity workers. Webuild a search-and-matching model with occupational choice, calibrated to the United Kingdom during theglobal financial and sovereign debt crises. Simulations show that a retention policy scheme aimed at reducingunemployment by nearly 1 percentage point would have been both welfare-enhancing and cost-effective.Average welfare would have increased by 0.06 percent in consumption-equivalent terms, with low-incomeworkers benefiting more than twice as much as the median worker by avoiding costly job switches andunemployment spells. The Welfare Implications ofJob Retention Schemes* Ippei Shibata§International Monetary Fund John Bluedorn†International Monetary Fund Jorge Mondragon‡International Monetary Fund Marina M. Tavares¶ International Monetary Fund January 2026 ABSTRACT This paper examines the welfare implications of job retention schemes, where governmentssubsidize employers to preserve jobs during downturns. Using EU microdata from 2003 to2018, we show that such schemes are associated with lower job separation rates, especiallyamong lower-productivity workers. We build a search-and-matching model with occupa-tional choice, calibrated to the United Kingdom during the global financial and sovereigndebt crises.Simulations show that a retention policy scheme aimed at reducing unem-ployment by nearly 1 percentage point would have been both welfare-enhancing and cost-effective. Average welfare would have increased by 0.06 percent in consumption-equivalentterms, with low-income workers benefiting more than twice as much as the median workerby avoiding costly job switches and unemployment spells. 1Introduction Job retention schemes–a form of active labor market policy–gained widespread attentionwith their implementation during the COVID-19 pandemic. These policies seek to mitigatethe adverse labor market effects of negative macroeconomic shocks by providing governmentsubsidies or other support to employers that are linked to the maintenance of their employ-ment relationships with workers.By helping firms pay their workers and keep them em-ployed, such measures allow firms to preserve the talent and experience of their workforceduring difficult times and enable them to ramp up operations quickly once economic activ-ity recovers, without having to go through the costly processes of hiring and training newworkers. Proponents argue that job retention schemes are a critical tool for preserving jobs andskills during downturns (ILO (2020), OECD (2020)).Opponents have raised concerns thatsuch policies may hinder necessary labor market reallocation after negative shocks, therebyslowing down economic recovery (Boeri and Bruecker (2011); Cahuc and Carcillo (2011)).Recent syntheses of the short-time work (STW) literature conclude that, despite strong evi-dence on employment stabilization, the welfare and fiscal evaluation of retention schemes–especially when they interact with unemployment insurance and reallocation incentives–remain an open area for research (Cahuc (2024); Giupponi et al. (2022)).This paper aimsto address this gap by providing new empirical, theoretical, and quantitative contributionson the economic effects of job retention schemes. Empirically, we find that job retention schemes are associated with significantly lower jobseparation rates, particularly for low-wage workers, with the effect being more pronouncedduring recessions.Leveraging EU microdata spanning 2003-2018, we estimate a linear re-gression model conditioning on worker income and education. Our analysis yields four keyfindings.1First, workers who experience job loss and later regain employment face largeearnings penalties, especially if they switch occupations. Second, separation rates are higherfor low