贸易战2.0：迫在眉睫的长期风险

Contents Executive Summary3Recent Developments on U.S. tariffs4Direct Impacts from U.S. tariffs8Twin Influx9Expansion of Section 232 Tariffs10Potential Transshipment Tariffs11Krungsri Research View13References15 Unlessexplicitly stated otherwise,this publication and all material therein isunder the copyright of Krungsri Research. As such, the reuse, reproduction, oralteration of this text or any part thereof is absolutely prohibited without priorwrittenconsent.This report draws on a wide range of well-established andtrustworthysources,but Krungsri Research can make no guarantee of theabsolute veracity of the material cited. Moreover, Krungsri Research will not beheld responsible for any losses that may occur either directly or indirectly fromany use towhich this report or the data contained therein may be put.Theinformation,opinions,and judgements expressed in this report are those ofKrungsri Research, but this publication does not necessarily reflect the opinionsof Bank of Ayudhya Public Company Limited or of any other companies withinthe same commercial group. This report is an accurate reflection of the thinkingand opinions of Krungsri Research as of the day of publication, but we reservethe right to change those opinions without prior notice. For research subscription, contactkrungsri.research@krungsri.com Executive Summary The announcement of a framework for a trade agreement between Thailand and the U.S. on October 26might be considered “good news” by many parties. However, Thailand had to make substantialconcessions to the U.S. in exchange for a reciprocal tariff of 19%, which is higher than the Effective TariffRate (ETR) previously imposed on Thailand, averaging only 0.7%. Meanwhile, Thailand remains subject toproduct-specific tariffs under Section 232 at the same rate as most countries and risks facing strictenforcement of a transshipment tariff in the future. One of the key concessions Thailand had to make was eliminating tariffs on U.S. goods, covering 99% of allproducts. We estimate that such a concession could lead to a significant increase in Thailand’s importsfrom the U.S., further exacerbating the existing influx of Chinese goods and resulting in a “Twin Influx.”Furthermore, even if the U.S. Supreme Court were to invalidate the reciprocal tariffs, the U.S. could stilluse other legal instruments to impose tariffs at levels comparable to current rates. Regardless of whether “the price Thailand has to pay” is ultimately worth it, we cannot deny that the Thaieconomy is currently facing growing risks. Thus, Thailand needs to swiftly reduce its reliance on the U.S.market, seek new trade partners, and expand cooperation with existing partners simultaneously. This is toallow Thailand to regain more autonomy in conducting proactive trade policies. It is also necessary toprepare support measures for Thai businesses in advance in a “prudent, comprehensive, and rigorous”manner. These changes will enable Thai businesses and the export sector to grow strongly and sustainablyunder a “Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous” (VUCA) world. Supasyn Itthiphatwong Recent Developments on U.S. tariffs After Donald Trump began his second term at the beginning of this year,the U.S. announced that it wouldimpose tariffs on various countries, which can be classified into two main groups: 1) Reciprocal tariffs,imposed on almost all products at the same rate,and 2) Section 232 tariffsunder the Trade Expansion Actof 1962, imposed on certain products, including autos and parts, steel and aluminum, copper, lumber andtimber, and trucks.Meanwhile, many countries have reached a framework for a trade agreement withthe U.S. to reduce such tariffsin exchange for increased imports and market access for U.S. goods,reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers, and expanded investment in the U.S. Reciprocal Tariffs Even though reciprocal tariffs might be ruled invalid, the U.S. can still use other legal instrumentsto impose tariffs at levels close to current rates. Although the U.S. has significantly reduced reciprocal tariff rates from those originally announced onApril 2, 2025, these rates remain substantially higher compared to the Effective Tariff Rates (ETR) theU.S. previously imposed on various countries at very low levels (Table 1).Specifically, the U.S. nowimposes a reciprocal tariff on Thailand at 19%, down from the 36% announced on April 2. While this rate isclose to those of other ASEAN nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Cambodia, itremains higher than those for certain countries, including South Korea, Japan, the EU, and Singapore.Moreover, it far exceeds the ETR previously imposed on Thailand, which averaged only 0.7%. The imposition of the reciprocal tariffs is carried out under the International Emergency Economic PowersAct (IEEPA), which is currently facing legal challenges in court. On August 29,theU.S. Court of Appeals forthe Federal Circuit affirmed the ruling of the Court of In