财政规则、稳健的修正机制和主权利差（英）

Fiscal Rules, RobustCorrection Mechanisms,and Sovereign Spreads Julien Acalin, Leonardo Martinez, and Francisco Roch WP/25/195 IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by theauthor(s) and are published to elicit comments and toencourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF,its Executive Board, or IMF management. 2025SEP IMF Working Paper Western Hemisphere Department Fiscal Rules, Robust Correction Mechanisms, and Sovereign SpreadsPrepared by Julien Acalin, Leonardo Martinez, and Francisco Roch* Authorized for distribution byNigel ChalkSeptember 2025 IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT:Both policy advice and economic theory advocate for fiscal rules with a clear anchor thatreflects fiscal risk and a robust correction mechanism that implements a more ambitious fiscal consolidationwhen fiscal risk is higher. However, among more than 120 countries with fiscal rules, only six are identified asimplementing such robust correction mechanisms: Armenia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Poland, andSlovakia. Using synthetic control methods and dynamic panel regressions, this paper finds that the introductionof fiscal rules with robust correction mechanisms has been particularly effective in these countries, triggering apersistent median spread reduction of about 25 percent, or 75 basis points, over one year. Fiscal Rules, Robust CorrectionMechanisms, and SovereignSpreads Prepared by Julien Acalin1, Leonardo Martinez1, and Francisco Roch2 1Introduction The importance of fiscal rules has been re-emphasized after COVID-19 pushed publicdebt to historically high levels, with economies continuing to face challenging economicconditions and increased spending pressures due to population aging, climate transition,and geopolitical tensions.1 In this difficult context, the commitment to future policiesimplied by fiscal rules can mitigate fiscal risk and thus improve access to debt markets(Hatchondo et al., 2022a). For example, IMF (2021) underscores that “a credible com-mitment to fiscal sustainability can buy flexibility and time.When lenders trust thatgovernments are fiscally responsible, financing deficits is easier and cheaper.”2 This paper contributes to the literature by showing that well-designed fiscal rules havebeen effective in mitigating fiscal risk, measured by sovereign bond spreads (the differencebetween the implicit yield of government bonds and a comparable risk-free interest rate).In particular, we focus on one fiscal rule feature that could improve compliance and thusthe performance of fiscal rules: Robust correction mechanisms, which specify automaticcorrective actions when fiscal targets are breached, including pre-specified fiscal measures.For example, incentives to comply with a rule’s debt ceiling could be stronger if notcomplying implies corrective actions such as increasing the fiscal balance to reduce thedebt level. However, if in turn not complying with this increase in the fiscal balance hasno consequence, promising this increase may not lend much credibility to the fiscal rule.In contrast, such fiscal balance increase could be more credible if pre-specified measuresto support this increase (for example, limiting the indexation of public wages) are part ofthe rule (constituting a robust correction mechanism). In our empirical section, we use synthetic control methods (Abadie, 2021) to iden-tify the effects of introducing fiscal rules with robust correction mechanisms (FRRC) onsovereign spreads.We find that FRRC trigger a median spread reduction of about 25percent, or 75 basis points for the average economy in our sample, over one year. Thisresult remains robust under alternative specifications.Then, we use dynamic panel re-gressions to study the longer-term effects of FRRC and again find that they significantlyreduce fiscal risk in the same proportions, even when compared with other fiscal rules. 1.1Robust Correction Mechanisms We focus on robust correction mechanisms because they are consistent with both policyadvice and economic theory advocating for more ambitious fiscal consolidation when fiscalrisk is higher.3 Caselli et al. (2022) states that “A country whose debt level exceeds thesafety margin to its debt limit should commit to a medium-term fiscal path that bringsit back to the anchor over time. The pace of adjustment set in the fiscal plans should bebased on an assessment of risks: the higher the risk, the faster the adjustment...”. Bohn(1998, 2008) shows that a fiscal reaction function such that the primary fiscal balanceincreases in the level of debt (which can be associated with the level of fiscal risk) issufficien