金融市场代币化的最优策略

Optimal Policy forFinancial MarketTokenization Itai Agur and Alexander Copestake WP/25/185 IMF Working Papersdescribe research inprogress by the author(s) and are published toelicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers arethose of the author(s) and do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,or IMF management. 2025SEP IMF Working Paper Research Department Optimal Policy for Financial Market TokenizationPrepared by Itai Agur and Alexander Copestake * Authorized for distribution by Maria Soledad Martinez PeriaSeptember2025 IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT:Competing broker initiatives to “tokenize” financial assets—i.e., represent them on programmableplatforms—promise efficiency gains but raise concerns about market fragmentation. Policymakers in severalcountries are considering supporting such platforms or mandating their interoperability. We provide the firstformal framework foranalyzing optimal policy in this context. Brokers with heterogeneous market powercompete to attract investors and execute their trades intra-broker or on a legacy platform. Coalitions of brokerscan invest in creating a tokenized market with faster, cheaper inter-broker settlement. Partial coalitions diverttrades away from excluded competitors, leading to equilibrium coalition structures that can feature excessiveinvestment or insufficient tokenization. Neither public-private cost-sharing nor interoperability mandates aresufficient to achieve the social optimum when used alone, but their combination is. These results withstandincorporating an open-access ledger (e.g., a public blockchain). Optimal Policy for Financial MarketTokenization Prepared by Itai Agur and Alexander Copestake 1Introduction The financial press is abuzz with talk of tokenizing financial assets, which is the creationof assets or representations of assets on a shared and programmable ledger (Agur et al.,2025b; Aldasoro et al., 2023).Programmability means that self-executing contracts canbe written on the ledger, which for instance enables the simultaneous and instantaneousexchange of a seller’s asset and a buyer’s payment.1While the measurement of tokenization’spotential impact is in its infancy, the first estimates indicate that the efficiency gains—suchas savings on settlement cost and time from automating some of the roles of specializedintermediaries like registrars and clearing houses—could be non-negligible.For instance,J.P. Morgan (2023) estimates that the continuous reinvestment of cash that is currentlylocked in during settlement on US financial markets reduces portfolio management costs by 22percent.2Several major brokers, including BlackRock, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, haveannounced tokenization initiatives, as have coalitions of brokers (e.g., Canton TokenizationNetwork; Regulated Settlement Network), leading to estimates of up to 16 trillion US dollarsof tokenized financial assets by 2030. Responding to these developments, policy institutions are beginning to take an activerole in the formation of tokenized financial markets.On one hand, they envision poten-tial efficiency gains; on the other, the proliferation of competing private ledger initiativesraises concerns of market fragmentation. Policymakers’ approaches range from ensuring theinteroperability of any privately created ledgers, as is the case in Singapore and under consid-eration in the UK, to public-private partnerships where the policymaker can take a leadingrole in the creation and operation of the new market infrastructure, as seen in Brazil and the multinational Project Agor´a.3 The involvement of policymakers in the formation of tokenized markets raises severalquestions.If preventing market fragmentation is the main justification for policy, whatare the economic forces driving brokers toward such fragmentation and why is this sociallycostly?What are the tradeoffs that policymakers face as they determine whether and towhat extent to become involved in tokenized market formation?If policy intervention isneeded, would regulation, like mandating interoperability, suffice? Or is there a need for thepublic sector to go further, such as by sharing costs in a public-private partnership to createa tokenized financial market? To help analyze these questions, we develop the first model ofoptimal policy for the formation of tokenized markets. We model an endowment economy containing retail investors that need brokers to matchthem to each other to trade. Investors are initially assigned to one broker and face switchingcosts to move to a different broker, which gives brokers market power. The first key featurewe aim to capture is heterogeneity in this market pow