财政压力下的货币政策：财政主导的前瞻性分析（英）

Donna Faye E. Bajaro, Jaqueson K. Galimberti, and Irfan A. Qureshi ADB Economics Working Paper Series Monetary Policy Under Fiscal Stress: Donna Faye E. Bajaro, Jaqueson K. Galimberti,and Irfan A. Qureshi Donna Faye E. Bajaro (dbajaro@adb.org) is aneconomics officer and Jaqueson K. Galimberti(jgalimberti@adb.org) is a senior economist atthe Economic Research and Development ImpactDepartment, Asian Development Bank (ADB).Irfan A. Qureshi (iqureshi@adb.org) is a senior public No. 797 | August 2025 TheADB Economics Working Paper Seriespresents research in progress to elicit commentsand encourage debate on development issuesin Asia and the Pacific. The views expressedare those of the authors and do not necessarily Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO) © 2025 Asian Development Bank6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City, 1550 Metro Manila, Philippines Some rights reserved. Published in 2025. ISSN 2313-6537 (print), 2313-6545 (PDF)Publication Stock No. WPS250323-2DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/WPS250323-2 The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policiesof the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for anyconsequence of their use. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers does not imply that they By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area in this document, ADB does notintend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area. This publication is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. By using the content of this publication, you agree to be boundby the terms of this license. For attribution, translations, adaptations, and permissions, please read the provisions This CC license does not apply to non-ADB copyright materials in this publication. If the material is attributedto another source, please contact the copyright owner or publisher of that source for permission to reproduce it. Please contact pubsmarketing@adb.org if you have questions or comments with respect to content, or if you wishto obtain copyright permission for your intended use that does not fall within these terms, or for permission to use ABSTRACT Subduedeconomic activity and low tax revenues,especially during crises,driveborrowing and increase public debt.During these periods, to ease the debt burden,central banks may face pressure to deviate from policy targets. Under fiscal dominance,debt sustainability relies on low interest rates and high inflation rather than consolidation.This paper empirically tests the presence of fiscal dominance using forward-looking 1INTRODUCTION Economic downturns, such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2007–2009 GlobalFinancial Crisis, magnified the complementary roles of fiscal and monetary policies.Governments stepped up to respond to the losses through stimulus packages andcountercyclical fiscal policies, and central banks (CBs) acted as lenders of last resort.Subsequently,the losses absorbed by governments and CBs were funded throughtaxation (e.g., inflation tax), borrowing, and sales of government assets to avoid large Fiscal imbalances have since reached new heights.Government stimuli in thecontext of subdued economic activity and constrained tax revenues led to the need foradditional borrowing, resulting in increased public debt. Meanwhile, inflation rates spikedglobally, leaving CBs with no choice but to increase interest rates. With the higher debt Inthis paper,we empirically investigate this question through the lens offorward-looking monetary policy rules.Namely, we estimate monetary policy rules thatexplicitly incorporate fiscal variables on a broad global sample of 52 economies over 3decades, covering both advanced and emerging economies, as well as economies with concerns about the sustainability ofdomesticdebt would put pressure on CBs to lowerinterest rates to reduce the debt servicing burden. Lower interest rates would also leadto higher gross domestic product (GDP) growth and inflation, both of which erode thereal value of debt. Second, in economies relying more strongly onexternaldebt, fiscal Our framework is motivated by the literature on the so-called “Taylor rule,” whichdepicts how CBs set interest rates to achieve price stability and sustained economicgrowth (Taylor, 1993).The forward-looking Taylor rule suggests that, whenexpectedinflation is above the target and/or whenexpectedoutput is higher than the potentialoutput, CBs set interest rates above the natural rate to decelerate economic activity andreduce inflationary pressures (Clarida et al., 2000).However, in a context of fiscalimbalances, monetary authorities may be put under pressure to