关税、美元与美国经济

April 2025 Tariffs, the dollar and the US economy Jean-Pierre LandauSciences Po INTRODUCTION Analysts and policymakers aligned with the new US administration are proposing tofundamentally ‘reconfigure’ the global trading and financial system, to better align itwith US economic interests. Their approach departs from traditional protectionism. They support and advocate theintensive use of tariffs, but as a revenue-raising and burden-sharing instrument. Theydo not dispute the mainstream argument that trade deficits reflect macroeconomicimbalances. On the contrary, they embrace it. They see a close connection betweenthe United States’ trade and currency regimes. Central to their analysis is theargument that persistent capital inflows into the United States have led to a chronicovervaluation of the dollar, undermining US industrial competitiveness and resultingin current account deficits In their view, these inflows are driven by two main factors. First, they reflect domesticdistortions in surplus economies – most notably China – which generate excess savingsthat spill over into the US economy. Second, they stem from the US dollar’s status asthe dominant global reserve currency, which creates a structural demand for dollar-denominated assets. Their policy recommendations are not conventional. Most notably, they propose thatthe United States impose penalties – or user fees – to discourage foreign governmentsfrom accumulating dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves. While others seethe dollar’s status as a ‘privilege’, these economists see it as a burden. A diminishedinternational role for the dollar is, in their view, an acceptable cost for achieving theirprimary objectives: revitalising US industry and balancing the current account. This Policy Insight mainly refers to two papers (Miran, 2024; Pettis and Hogan 2024),jointly characterised, for the sake of simplicity, as representing the ‘new arrangement’.The first part discusses technical aspects of their analysis and recommendations. Inthe second part, their proposals are evaluated from the point of view of long-term USeconomic interests. A DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN ARGUMENTS AND PROPOSALS Three main arguments underpin the reasoning: (1) China’s domestic policies aremainly responsible for global imbalances and the US current account deficit; (2)tariffs can improve US welfare through better fiscal burden sharing with foreigners;and (3) the role of the dollar as a reserve currency is directly responsible for USdeindustrialisation. China and the US current account deficit The analysis starts with two fundamental truths: first, the current account is themirror image of the domestic saving–investment balance; second, this balance doesnot only reflect private sector decisions but is directly or indirectly distorted bydomestic public policies. A good argument can certainly be made that China’s current account is significantlyinfluenced by public policies. China’s overall saving rate is exceptionally high andpersistently so. Households are incentivised – and, in some cases, compelled – to save,due to the absence of a comprehensive social safety net and the underdevelopment ofcredit and saving instruments. Also, the labour share of national income in China iscomparatively low and has decreased over the last decade. The counterpart is highprofitability of corporations, an important contribution to aggregate savings. As theargument goes, income distribution policies effect ‘indirect transfers’ to the benefit ofcorporations and exporters. In that sense, all domestic policies “act as a form of tradepolicy” (Pettis and Hogan, 2024). Finally, through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) andpublic subsidies, the Chinese authorities exert significant influence over the allocationand subsidisation of capital. However, this is not the whole story. China also benefits from a deeper, more structuraladvantage: the size and diversity of its economy. China's current GDP is comparableto that of the entire global economy in the 1980s, at the height of globalisation. Sizenaturally generates economies of scale and learning-by-doing effects – both of whichare further reinforced by state support. The combination of scale effects and industrial policy generates economic dynamismand market distortions. Identifying and disentangling these distortions is essential foreffective policy responses and should be a priority for China’s economic competitors. Closely related is another, more questionable claim that China’s excess savings ‘force’dissaving in the United States (Pettis and Hogan, 2024). The argument posits thatChina’s surplus inevitably leads to reduced savings by US households and corporates.It suggests that trade and financial relations with China deprive the United States ofits ‘economic agency’ and that US policymakers in fact have little control over domesticmacroeconomic outcomes. This view is misguided. Even if capital flows are ‘pushed’ into the US economy, theyonly im