被关税和贸易战困扰：美国农业的积极贸易政策（英）2026

Wars: A Positive Trade Policy forUS Agriculture. Warren Maruyama, Joseph Glauber, Alan Wm. Wolff, and May 2026 Warren H. Maruyama,Senior Counsel Emeritusat Hogan Lovells, servedas General Counsel atthe Office of the USTrade Representative(2007–2009) andAssociate Director forInternational EconomicPolicy on the WhiteHouse staff (1989–1992).The views expressedhere are his own and ABSTRACT US farmers have been some of the biggest beneficiaries of US freetrade agreements and the postwar creation of a rules-based globaltrading system. The entry into force of the North American Free TradeAgreement in 1994, the World Trade Organization’s Agreement onAgriculture in 1995, and the enactment of the Freedom to Farm Actin 1996 contributed to a more than doubling of farm incomes over thepast decades. Accordingly, farmers have been disadvantaged by the INTRODUCTION The Trump administration has deployed tariffs against importsgenerally—across all types of goods from nearly all US tradingpartners, in violation of its international commitments. It has donethis without consulting Congress, which has the power to regulatecommerce under Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution.Foreign reactions have been generally muted, given broader One large source of trade uncertainty is the frequently changingdetails of the Trump tariffs—on again, off again, rates raised andlowered, product exclusions, bilateral adjustment deals. Another InLearning Resources v. Trump, Slip Opinion No. 24–1287(February 20, 2026), the Supreme Court held that President DonaldTrump’s tariffs under the International Emergency Economic PowersAct1(IEEPA) were unlawful. The president and his top advisors hadalready made it clear they would impose tariffs under Section 122 ofthe Trade Act of 1974 as an interim measure. On May 7, the Court of Section 1223and IEEPA tariffs. The threat of restoring broad tariffsto replace the reciprocal tariffs remains current and is expected.This could include tariffs at even higher rates than those imposed on These tariffs are not the only current threat to trade. Thepresident threatened to cut off trade with Spain completely after itrefused to allow use of its airspace in the current Iran war and hasthreatened to raise US tariffs on European cars from 15 to 25 percentafter critical comments by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz of hislack of a clear strategy in the Iran conflict. As Spain and Germany The United States is forging a radically new path on tradeand is at risk of turning its back on the lessons of history. Absentagreed rules and enforcement mechanisms in treaties and tradeagreements, governments are free to impose protectionist tariffsand quotas, discriminate against imports, subsidize domestic disadvantaged by the United Kingdom’s Imperial Preferences anddiscriminatory European tariff schedules.5The negotiations of theGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 and the Depending on what the president chooses to do in this unsettledsituation, the prospect of another wave of punitive US tariffsincreases retaliation risks for American exporters, and particularlyfor US agriculture. With the exception of China and some modestretaliatory tariffs from Canada, the Trump administration hasmanaged to avoid formal retaliation against US agriculture during hissecond term, although increased Chinese sourcing of soybeans from As a result, farm production and incomes are highly export-dependent at a time when the United States faces increasingly 5Douglas A. Irwin,Clashing over Commerce: A History of US TradePolicy(University of Chicago Press, 2017), 362.6China has always sourced in part from Brazil. The difficulty is that thepercentage of sourcing in Brazil is increasing as Brazil converts more (depending on the commodity) Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,and Europe, and the postwar rules-based global trading system is indisarray. In addition, US agriculture is almost invariably targeted for Growth of US exports of bulk commodities like grains, oilseeds,soybeans, and cotton has slowed over the past decade, anddid so in 2022. It is true that the United States started runningagricultural trade deficits. This is, however, due to price levels ofexports (which are largely bulk commodities that have declinedover the past few years) and those of imports (which are largelyvalue-added products that have increased with inflation). There isno question that improved market access would help US farmersover the longer run, but it has nothing to do with the agricultural Partnership (CPTPP) and the 15-member Regional ComprehensiveEconomic Partnership (RCEP), as well as to hedge their bets against There is an unfortunate combination of concurrent factorsthat do not bode well for US agriculture: a shift in focus of tradepolicymakers toward supply chain resilience during the COVID-19pandemic, followed by more aggressive use of tariffs by Presidents I. US EFFORTS TO EXPAND AGRICULTURAL EXPORTSTHROUGH THE GATT/WTO SYSTE