贸易伙伴对美国关税的回应（英）

We are grateful to Diego Cerdeiro, Kenneth Kang, Martin Sommer, and participants at the IMF internal seminar and Banque deFrance “International Trade and Industrial Policy in A changing World” conference for useful comments and discussions. The viewsexpressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMFIMF Working PaperStrategy, Policy & ReviewTradePartners’Responses to USTariffsPrepared by Lorenzo Rotunno and Michele Ruta*Authorized for distribution by Martin SommerJuly2025IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.ABSTRACT:Recently announced and enacted US tariffs reduce partners’ access to the US market and leadto trade diversion. Impacted countries may respond in (at least) three ways: imposing retaliatory tariffs on theUS, resorting to industrial policy to support their producers, and/or signing trade agreements to find new marketaccess opportunities. Relying on a quantitative trade model, we study the trade and welfare implications ofthese policy responses. Retaliation hurts US exports, can improve the terms of trade, but also createsdistortions. Subsidies can expand exports, making up for lost markets in the US, but they are costly, increasedistortions especially for the subsidizers, and worsen trade diversion effects that could eventually lead to newtariffs targeting subsidizers. Seeking deeper integration with other partners can help countries expand tradewhile reducing distortions. Even in presence of US tariffs, real income for the liberalizing countries and theworld is higher when partners choose to deepen integration as part of their policy strategy.F12, F14Tariffs; retaliation; industrial policy; trade agreements.lrotunno@imf.org; mruta@imf.org. JEL Classification Numbers: management.Keywords:Author’s E-Mail Address: * [Trade Spillovers of domestic subsidies]Working Paper No. [WP/2024/###]Trade partners’ responses to UStariffsPrepared by Lorenzo Rotunno and Michele Ruta11We are grateful to Diego Cerdeiro, Kenneth Kang, Martin Sommer, and participants at the IMF internal seminar and Banque de France“International Trade and Industrial Policy in A changing World” conference for useful comments and discussions. The views expressed inthis paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. Trade Partners’ Responses to US Tariffs∗Lorenzo Rotunno†Michele Ruta‡July 3, 2025AbstractRecently announced and enacted US tariffs reduce partners’ access to the USmarket and lead to trade diversion.Impacted countries may respond in (atleast) three ways:imposing retaliatory tariffs on the US, resorting to indus-trial policy to support their producers, and/or signing trade agreements to findnew market access opportunities.Relying on a quantitative trade model, westudy the trade and welfare implications of these policy responses. Retaliationhurts US exports, can improve the terms of trade, but also creates distortions.Subsidies can expand exports, making up for lost markets in the US, but theyare costly, increase distortions especially for the subsidizers, and worsen tradediversion effects that could eventually lead to new tariffs targeting subsidizers.Seeking deeper integration with other partners can help countries expand tradewhile reducing distortions.Even in presence of US tariffs, real income for theliberalizing countries and the world is higher when partners choose to deepenintegration as part of their policy strategy.JEL classification: F12, F14.Key Words: Tariffs, retaliation, industrial policy, trade agreements.We are grateful to Diego Cerdeiro, Kenneth Kang, Martin Sommer, and participants at the IMFinternal seminar and Banque de France “International Trade and Industrial Policy in A changingWorld” conference for useful comments and discussions. The views expressed in this paper are thoseof the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMFmanagement.International Monetary Fund and Aix-Marseille University. Email: lrotunno@imf.org. Tel.: +(1)202 623 0083International Monetary Fund. Email: mruta@imf.org. Tel.: +(1) 202 623 0977 1IntroductionThe recent announcements and imposition of new import tariffs by the US adminis-tration have opened a policy and academic debate on the impacts of the tariffs on theUS, its trading partners and the global economy more generally (Baqaee and Malm-berg, 2025; Clausing and Lovely, 2024; Bouët et al., 2024; IMF, 2025; WTO, 2025).As the tariffs reshape trade flows, trading partners may adopt various policy strate-gies to support their producers and mitigate potential negative spillovers. This paperquantitatively assesses the trade effects