海军和海岸警卫队造船计划及造船工业基地面临的挑战

Challenges Facing the Navy’s andCoast Guard’s Shipbuilding Programsand the Shipbuilding Industrial Base Eric J. LabsSenior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons At a Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Seapowerand Projection Forces, Committee on Armed Services, and theSubcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,U.S. House of Representatives Chairman Ezell, Chairman Kelly, Ranking MemberCarbajal, and Ranking Member Courtney, thank youfor inviting me to testify about the Navy’s and CoastGuard’s shipbuilding programs and the shipbuildingindustrial base. This testimony is largely based on theCongressional Budget Office’s analysis of the Navy’s2025 shipbuilding plan and of the Coast Guard’s majorcutter programs. The Trump Administration did notrelease a 2026 shipbuilding plan for the Navy, and the2027 shipbuilding plan, sometimes called the GoldenFleet plan, is still forthcoming. The source of the increase in costs per ship varies byprogram, but inflation in the wake of the COVID-19pandemic, workforce challenges in the shipbuildingindustrial base, the feasibility of the original cost esti-mate, and difficulty completing the designs of new shipswere common factors. Prominent examples of all fourof those phenomena include the Navy’s Constellationclass FFG-62 frigate and the Coast Guard’s new heavyicebreaker, the polar security cutter (PSC). Where Ships Are BuiltAlthough hundreds of companies are involved in build- ing ships and their components, the Navy’s and CoastGuard’s ships are built primarily by eight shipyards: The Navy’s Unmet Goals for aLarger FleetFor more than 20 years, the Navy has endeavored to build a larger fleet. In that time, the Navy’s goals forits manned fleet have ranged from 306 ships to, mostrecently, 381 ships. As a result, every 30-year shipbuild-ing plan the Navy has produced since at least 2011 hasproposed building a larger fleet by purchasing more shipsand, sometimes, by extending the service life of severalships or entire classes of ship. For a variety of reasons,the Navy has never been able to increase the size of itsfleet as much as it envisioned in its shipbuilding plans(seeFigure 1). Often, the resources required to buildthe larger fleet exceeded those that were made availableto the Navy. In more recent years, the Navy and theshipbuilding industrial base have had the resources buthave been unable to deliver the ships that the service hasordered in a timely manner. •Austal Shipbuilding in Mobile, Alabama, which isowned by Austal Limited of Henderson, WesternAustralia, builds littoral combat ships, Coast Guardcutters, small support ships, and parts of submarines. •Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine, which is ownedby General Dynamics of Reston, Virginia, buildsdestroyers. •Bollinger Shipyards in Mississippi and Louisianabuilds Coast Guard icebreakers, cutters, and patrolboats; Navy towing, salvage, and rescue ships; andoceanographic survey ships. •Fincantieri Marinette Marine in Marinette,Wisconsin, which is owned by Fincantieri of Trieste,Italy, builds the Navy’s new Constellation class frigateand previously built littoral combat ships. Cost Growth in MajorShipbuilding ProgramsOver the past decade, major Navy and Coast Guard •General Dynamics Electric Boat (hereafter, ElectricBoat) in Groton, Connecticut, which is owned byGeneral Dynamics, builds nuclear-powered ballisticmissile and attack submarines. programs have experienced substantial cost growth.Under the 2025 shipbuilding plan (which covers 2025 to2054), the Navy budgeted more than $10 billion in cost-to-complete funding for shipbuilding.1Cost-to-completeamounts are the additional funding a shipbuildingprogram needs to pay for cost growth in ships thatwere already authorized and fully funded by Congressin prior years. Cost overruns have affected nearly everymajor Navy shipbuilding program, though the amountshave varied. In addition, the price per ship for majorNavy and Coast Guard shipbuilding programs has alsoincreased substantially, even after removing the effects ofinflation (seeTable 1). •Ingalls Shipbuilding of Pascagoula, Mississippi,which is owned by Huntington Ingalls Industries ofNewport News, Virginia, builds large and medium-sized amphibious warfare ships and destroyers. It alsobuilt the Coast Guard’s national security cutters. •National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, orNASSCO, in San Diego, California, which is ownedby General Dynamics, builds large combat logisticsand support ships. •Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News,Virginia, which is owned by Huntington IngallsIndustries, builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers,ballistic missile submarines, and attack submarines. all of which have been delayed beyond their contracteddelivery dates by varying amounts: Delays in Navy andCoast Guard ShipbuildingMany of the Navy’s and Coast Guard’s shipbuilding programs are currently experiencing schedule delays inaddition to cost growth. •The F