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The EU’s Energy Transition:Investment ImpactandRoleof Carbon Pricing RevenueRecycling Benjamin Carton, Geoffroy Dolphin, Romain Duval, Andrew Hodge, AmitKara, Simon Voigts, Sebastian Wende WP/26/46 IMF Working Papersdescribe research inprogress by the author(s) and are published toelicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers arethose of the author(s) and do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,or IMF management. IMFWorkingPaper EuropeanDepartmentand Research Department TheEU’sEnergyTransition: InvestmentImpact andRole ofCarbon PricingRevenueRecyclingPreparedbyBenjamin Carton,Geoffroy Dolphin,Romain Duval,Andrew Hodge,Amit Kara,Simon Voigts,Sebastian Wende AuthorizedfordistributionbyKristina Kostialand Rafael PortilloMarch2026 IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement. ABSTRACT:TheEU has ambitious goals for climate and energy security. Its targets and policiesmayhavelarge macroeconomic implications, but investmentimpactsare particularly uncertain.Detailed"bottom-up"approachesbased on sectoral calculationspoint to investment increasesof 2 to 3 percent of GDP annually,while “top down”general equilibriummodelsoftenyieldnegligible aggregate investmenteffects.Further, theinvestment and broader macroeconomic impacts of the EU’s energy transition will depend on how carbonpricing revenues are recycled.This paperaddresses these issuesusing a modeling technique that bridgesbottom-up and top-down approaches. ANew Keynesiangeneral equilibrium model (GMMET) is extended tofeaturea detailed representation of energy usein key emitting sectors, including buildings, transport andenergy-intensive manufacturing. Simulations suggest that achieving the EU’s 2035climate goals implies anincrease in aggregateannualinvestment ofjustaround1 percent of GDP.More broadly, the EU’s energytransition only has modest macroeconomic impactsifit combinescarbon pricingandgreen subsidies, partlybecause these are complementary—green subsidies lower energy prices and inflation andraiseoutput,carbon pricing has opposite effects,and thereforecombining both yields small effects on all accounts.Thefiscalcostof the transitionismodestprovided decarbonization relies sufficiently on carbon pricing;whilerevenues from ETS1 and ETS2 could eventually reach about 1 percent of GDP, thepublic investment cost ofthe transitionis less than0.5 percent of GDPannually,leavingnet fiscal space that could be used forotherpolicy objectives. The EU’sEnergyTransition:InvestmentImpact andRole ofCarbonPricingRevenueRecycling PreparedbyBenjamin Carton,Geoffroy Dolphin, Romain Duval, AndrewHodge, Amit Kara, Simon Voigts, Sebastian Wende1 Contents I.Introduction......................................................................................................................................................3II.Previous Estimates of Investment Costs and Sources of Heterogeneity..................................................6III.Model-Based Analysis.................................................................................................................................12IV.Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................23Annex I. Current EU Policies to Reduce Emissions......................................................................................26Annex II. An Extension of the GMMET Model and its Calibration................................................................28References.........................................................................................................................................................33 I.Introduction TheEuropean Union’s (EU)ambitious climate and energy security goals will have materialmacroeconomic implications, including for investment, energy prices and competitiveness.The EU hasmultiple climate-related targets and policy instruments, anchored around a ‘Fit for 55’ agenda that aims to reduceEU emissions by 55 percent below 1990 levels by 2030 (Annex 1). An amplification of this agenda between 2030and 2040is planned;theEuropean Parliament and member states have recently provisionally approvedabinding90 percentcut—still vis-à-vis 1990 levels—by 2040,whilethe European Councilhasalso endorsedaninterim 2035 target range of 66.25–72.5 percent. There is broad consensus that meeting the2030 and future2040 objectives will require sizeable new investment to decarbonize key emitting sectors such as electricity,transport, buildings and energy-intensive manufacturing industries (see e.g. Andersson and others, 2025;European Commission, 2023;IEA, 2024). However, existing estimates of these macroeconomic implicat