哈萨克斯坦共和国：选定问题

SELECTED ISSUES This paperonthe Republic of Kazakhstanwas prepared by a staff team of theInternational Monetary Fund as background documentation for the periodic consultationwith the member country. It is based on the information available at the time it wascompleted onJanuary 5, 2026. Copies of this report are available to the public from International Monetary Fund•Publication ServicesPO Box 92780•Washington, D.C. 20090Telephone: (202) 623-7430•Fax: (202) 623-7201E-mail:publications@imf.org Web:http://www.imf.org International Monetary FundWashington, D.C. REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN SELECTED ISSUES Approved ByMiddle East andCentral AsiaDepartment Prepared ByDyna Hengand Thomas Piontek (MCD). CONTENTS KAZAKHSTAN: STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, THE FISCAL STANCE, AND RISKS _2 A. Background __________________________________________________________________________2B. SOEs and the Fiscal Stance ___________________________________________________________4C. SOEs and Fiscal Risks_________________________________________________________________8D. Policy Recommendations to Reduce Contingent Fiscal Risks ______________________10 References____________________________________________________________________________12 APPENDIX I. Government’s Plans to Promote Investment Growth _______________________________13 KAZAKHSTAN: STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, THEFISCAL STANCE, AND RISKS1 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain a cornerstone of Kazakhstan’s economy and growth model.Their large presence has two key implications for policy. First, SOEs’ quasi-fiscal activities conductedoutside the fiscal framework obscure the overall fiscal stance, complicating macroeconomicmanagement, while crowding out private sector activity. Second, the performance and liabilities ofSOEs pose contingent fiscal risks, particularly if commodity prices decline or financial conditionstighten. This paper estimates that the balance sheet expansion by major SOEs averaged about20 percent of the state budget expenditure over the past five years. If this activity were booked asbudgetary expenditure, the non-oil deficit would have been about 3.5 percentage points higher in2024–25, indicating a larger fiscal expansion than recorded in official budget figures. Additionally, theongoing underperformance of several SOEs could create significant contingent fiscal risks for thegovernment. Therefore, policymakers should carefully calibrate SOEs’ investment plans to ensureconsistency with the overall fiscal stance, regularly monitor the financial health and performance ofSOEs, and evaluate their potential impact on public finances. Limiting quasi-fiscal activities, enhancingtransparency, strengthening governance, and accelerating privatization are critical reforms toimplement. A.Background Union in 1991.In the 2000s, the governmentcreated large holding structures to managestate assets: Samruk Kazyna (SK) in 2008 andBaiterek National Managing Holding (BNMH)in 2013. SK oversees strategic assets in keysectors such as oil, gas, electricity,telecommunications, and infrastructure. BNMHwas formed from several development banksand funds, with the aim of supporting lendingto SMEs, housing, agriculture, andinfrastructure projects. Total assets of SK andBNMH more than tripled from about 16 trilliontenge in 2013 to 55 trillion tenge (about USD110 billion) in 2024 (text chart). Their combined Sources: Companies consolidated financial reports; staffestimates. economic footprint has been persistently high, at around 40 percent of GDP on average. 2.SOEs carry out policy mandates on behalf of the state, such as housing subsidies, SMElending, and infrastructure development. SK manages a substantial portfolio of non-financialSOEs. As of end-2024, SK’s assets amounted to the equivalent of 31 percent of GDP, while its debtstood at around 12 percent of GDP. Key companies in SK’s portfolio include the oil and gas giantKazMunaiGas, uranium producer Kazatomprom, national airline Air Astana, electricity systemoperator KEGOC, telecommunications provider Kazakhtelecom, and postal operator Kazpost.KazMunaiGas is by far the largest subsidiary, accounting for roughly 50 percent of SK’s total assets,while Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ), QazaqGas, and Kazatomprom each represent more than 5percent of the portfolio. 3.BNMH’s balance sheet has also grown substantially, from less than one percent of GDPto about 10 percent in 2024.BNMH and its subsidiaries extend support to hundreds of investmentprojects (SMEs, industry, housing) (text chart). BNMH’s total assets roughly doubled from 2020 toabout 13 trillion by end 2024, largely driven by large lending programs. BNMH’s Otbasy Bank, forinstance, has facilitated affordable mortgages for tens of thousands of households of families underthe Nurly Zher program. Similarly, the Development Bank of Kazakhstan (DBK) is a key state-ownedfinancial institution focused on supporting Kazakhstan’s economic development by providing long-term financing and fo