中国-拉丁美洲和加勒比经济公报2025年版

2025 EDITION BY REBECCA RAY AND ENRIQUE DUSSEL PETERS Rebecca Rayis a Senior Academic Researcher at the Boston UniversityGlobal Development Policy Center. She leads the Forests, Agricultureand Indigenous (FAIR) workstream, which produces policy-relevantresearch on local social and environmental risks and impacts of Chineseoverseas economic activity. She holds a PhD in Economics from theUniversity of Massachusetts-Amherst and an MA in InternationalDevelopment from the Elliott School of International Affairs at theGeorge Washington University. Enrique Dussel Petersis a Professor at the Graduate School ofEconomics at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), andis the Coordinator of the Center for Chinese-Mexican Studies (Cechimex)of the School of Economics at UNAM and of the Academic Network ofLatin America and the Caribbean on China (Red ALCChina). He holdsa PhD in Economics from the University of Notre Dame. He is authorof chapters and books on political economy, industrial organization,development, processes of segments of global value chains and thesocioeconomic Latin America and Caribbean-China relationship. Heholds a Ph.D. in Economics at the University of Notre Dame. SUGGESTED CITATION Ray, R., and Dussel Peters, E. 2025. “China-Latin America and the Caribbean EconomicBulletin, 2025 Edition.” Boston University Global Development Policy Center. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research benefitted greatly from helpful comments by Mengdi Yue. CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY4INTRODUCTION7TRADE IN GOODS8INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS14CHINESE OVERSEAS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LAC16CHINESE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN LAC22OUTLOOK FOR CHINA-LAC COOPERATION27REFERENCES30 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In 2024, China’s relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) continued to grow,especially in the emerging sectors of renewable energy, energy transition minerals and electricmobility. However, lower-technology sectors such as agriculture and mining continued todominate trade and are likely to continue their prominent role in trans-Pacific relations. These are among the findings of this year’s China-Latin America and the Caribbean EconomicBulletin. The goal of this report is to provide analysts and observers a reference to the ever-changing landscape of China-LAC economic relations—a landscape where data is not alwaysreadily accessible. Key findings: •In 2024, LAC exports to China fell moderately to $190.9 billion, while Chinese exportsto LAC grew significantly to an estimated $286.7 billion. Thus, LAC’s trade deficit withChina rose to a record 1.4 percent of regional GDP; China now represents 13 percent ofLAC’s exports and 22 percent of the region’s imports. •Among LAC’s top exports to China, raw materials predominate and have grown evenmore important. For example, refined copper products have declined in importancewhile unrefined copper ores and concentrates have grown dramatically. Furthermore,frozen beef has grown in importance and replaced refined copper as the fifth mostimportant LAC-China export commodity.•Chinese contractors’participation in LAC infrastructure projects has increaseddramatically in the last five years, rising by over 50 percent compared to the previousfive years. In particular, Chinese firms’ provision of transportation infrastructure hasgrown to displace energy as the most important sector.•Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) slowed slightly from 2020-2024 compared to the previous five years. Nevertheless, Chinese OFDI in sectorsassociated with climate change has grown rapidly. Within the mining, minerals andmetals sector in producing transition minerals (those minerals associated with theglobal energy transition), Chinese OFDI has more than doubled. Among energy OFDIprojects, wind and solar power generation has grown by more than 50 percent. Finally,within automotive manufacturing, most Chinese OFDI has supported manufacturingelectric vehicles or a mix of electric and internal combustion rather than simply internalcombustion vehicles. •Chinese overseas development finance (ODF)—sovereign finance from China’s twodevelopment finance institutions (DFIs), the China Development Bank (CDB) and theExport-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM)—rose to $2.8 billion in 2024, representing thehighest level in five years. It is now roughly on par with the levels just before the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak and well below its peak years from a decade ago. •Since 2020, almost all of China’s ODF in LAC has gone to the finance and financialintermediaries sector, supporting national development banks in LAC (and particularlyBrazil) rather than specific projects. This pivot gives national institutions the role ofproject selection and oversight.•Looking forward, the direction of the China-LAC economic relationship will hinge onseveral factors, including increased trade tension between the United States and bothLAC and China, which will bolster Chinese demand for LAC agricultural products, as wellas new agre