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SFT指南和特许经营合同模板——更新说明2——责任上限

信息技术2025-11-10苏格兰期货信托基金L***

AI智能总结

1.0 背景
SFT 指南《电动汽车基础设施服务合同的商业考量》中提到高阶评论，涵盖电动汽车充电点特许权合同中相关的商业考量，包括赔偿和责任上限。本说明针对责任上限提供额外评论，回应市场反馈和采购经验，参考 SFT 在 PPP 类项目的广泛经验和历史 HMT SoPC4 指南。目标是帮助地方当局考虑建立责任上限的方法，前提是当局认为这些方法是适当的，并且代表物有所值（VfM）。
本说明不涵盖确定任何责任上限金额的方法，这应按项目具体情况考虑。与 PPP 领域相比，电动汽车充电点特许权合同存在一些关键差异：1）地方当局不是购买服务，而是让充电点运营公司从地方当局场地为第三方提供服务；2）当前市场中的电动汽车充电点特许权合同可能由交通苏格兰的补助金和第三方股权（来自运营公司内部资源或第三方资金）混合资助。无论项目如何资助，都应探索项目资助者接受责任上限立场和任何母公司担保相关要求的能力。

2.0 一般赔偿
• 某些类型的责任不能被上限（例如因疏忽导致的死亡或人身伤害）。
• 地方当局不应常规提供赔偿上限，并且只有在认为这提供明确 VfM 时，才应允许对其他类型的赔偿进行上限或限制。

3.0 总体责任上限
• 典型的 PPP 类合同通常不提供总体责任上限。如果电动汽车充电点特许权合同提供总体责任上限，根据上限水平，这可能削弱将经济风险转移给特许权经营者的过程。
• 更好的方法是让当局考虑是否有一些特定的责任可以基于 VfM 进行上限，而不是使用总体上限。

4.0 唯一补救措施条款
• 如果当局通过 KPI 框架应用服务信用或绩效扣除，通常不应寻求额外赔偿。
• 这种“唯一补救措施”原则仅用于防止对同一损失的双重回收。如果特许权经营者存在违反合同的情况，导致当局遭受损失，而 KPI 框架未能涵盖这些损失，当局将需要不同的补救措施，可能是赔偿或违约索赔。

5.0 晚服务开始
• 安装期间电动汽车充电特许权的两个主要可交付成果是：提前于与交通苏格兰商定的日期将现有 EVCI 从 CPS 网络迁移，以及按照补助金信函中概述的结果交付扩展网络。
• 如果特许权经营者未能达到商定的现有 EVCI 从 CPS 网络迁移日期，当局可能面临额外成本或收入损失。设定赔偿或服务信用为预估成本/收入损失是合理的方法。假设没有减轻情况，建议当局不应上限特许权经营者未能达到商定迁移里程碑的责任。然而，当局还应考虑延迟迁移、应用违约金/服务信用和终止权之间的相互作用。换句话说，当局在考虑终止特许权之前，可以容忍多少延迟。
• 如果网络扩展计划未能按时交付，当局可能无法遵守补助金信函中规定的条件。尽管网络扩展计划交付延迟，当局不太可能遭受损失；因此，当局应咨询关于应用赔偿或服务信用是否适当以及应设定在什么水平。如果采取这种方法，并且假设没有减轻情况，建议当局不应上限特许权经营者未能达到扩展交付里程碑的责任。类似地，当局应考虑延迟网络扩展、违约金和终止权之间的相互作用。

6.0 绩效扣除
• 在某些行业，通常会对可以就绩效不佳做出的财务扣除金额设置上限。
• 在电动汽车充电点特许权中，如果服务不可用，特许权经营者将不会从合同中产生收入。因此，重要的是，通过 KPI 框架征收的任何财务扣除应仅限于当局遭受服务损失的情况。
• 对当局的绩效扣除支付进行上限不应使特许权经营者免于财务风险。任何绩效扣除上限必须始终基于 VfM 基础。
• 地方当局应确保特许权经营者保持提供高质量服务的激励，因此不应在没有适当建议的情况下让步于扣除上限。
• “回顾性”扣除（在支付机制下）——当局发现存在未经检测一段时间的绩效失败——如果使用，则可能适用上限。

7.0 提前终止情况下的责任
• 地方当局应与法律顾问讨论采取的方法和计算提前终止特许权合同应付补偿金额的方法。
• SFT 已制定讨论文件（更新说明-1-提前终止补偿），当局应参考。
• 如果由于特许权经营者违约，当局选择终止合同并采用“重新招标”或“不重新招标方法”，这可能导致当局欠特许权经营者金额（即“终止金额”为负）。
• 地方当局可能希望考虑在这种情况下上限当局从特许权经营者应得的金额。
• 如果是这样，重要的是确保任何上限都考虑当局在终止事件中预期的成本。
• SFT 的模板合同列出了除绩效不佳外其他重大违约事件。当局应与法律顾问讨论是否任何上限应仅限于与 KPI 框架下绩效不佳相关的违约事件，或包括模板合同中规定的其他重大违约事件。

8.0 采购考量
• 任何责任上限应在采购过程一开始就引入，以便所有投标人可以基于相同的基础定价。
• 责任上限将是项目资助者的关键问题，当局应在采购过程中确信所有资助者（无论是内部还是外部）都批准了项目的范围和合同条款——包括责任上限和母公司担保的立场。

EVIF Programme-SFT Guidance and Template Concession Contact–Update Note 2-Liability Caps-November2025 Version 1.003 November 2025 Contents 1.0Background.................................................................................................................22.0General Indemnities.....................................................................................................33.0Overall Limitation of Liability........................................................................................34.0Sole Remedy Provisions...............................................................................................3 EVIF Programme-SFT Guidance and Template Concession Contact–Update Note 2-Liability Caps–November2025 Version 1.0 Disclaimer: The text below relates to the procurement of EV ChargePoint concessioncontracts by Scottish local authorities. It is intended to provide authorities with points fordiscussion with their internal / external legal advisers to inform approaches to 1.0Background SFT’s guidance “Commercial Considerations for EV Infrastructure Service Contracts”includes high-level commentary on a range of commercial considerations relevant to EV This note provides additional commentary on liability caps, responding to market feedbackand experience from procurements, drawing on SFT’s wider experience of PPP typeprojects and historic HMT SoPC4 guidance for the PFI/PPP sector. The objective is tohelp This note does not cover the methodology for establishing a quantum for any liability cap, There are some key differences that need to be borne in mind when making a comparisonfrom the PPP sector with an EV charge point concession contract. 1.In an EV charge point concession contract the local authority is not buying a servicebut enabling a charge point operating company to provide a service to third parties 2.In the current market, EV charge point concession contracts are likely to be fundedthrough a mixture of grant funding from Transport Scotland and third-party equitysourced either from the charge point operating company’s internal resources orfrom thirdparty funders. Regardless of how the project is funded, the ability of the 2.0General Indemnities •Certain types of liabilities can’t be capped (e.g. for death or personal injury due tonegligence).•Authorities should not offer caps on indemnities as a matter of course and should 3.0Overall Limitation of Liability •An overall liability cap is generally not provided for in a typical PPP type contract. Ifan overall liability cap were to be offered in an EV charge point concession contract,depending on the level of the cap, this could undermine the transfer of economicrisk to the concessionaire. 4.0Sole Remedy Provisions •If the authority is applying service credits or performance deductions through theKPI framework, it should generally not seek compensation in damages in addition to •This ‘sole remedy’ principle should only operate to prevent double recovery for thesame loss. There could be breaches by the concessionaire which cause losses tothe authority that aren’t captured by the KPI framework. If so, the authority will need 5.0Late Service Commencement •The two main deliverables for an EV charging concession during the installationperiod are the migration of existing EVCI off the CPS network in advance of the dateagreed with Transport Scotland, and the delivery of an expanded network in line with •If the concessionaire fails to meet the agreed date for the migration of existing EVCIoff the CPS network, the authority could be exposed to additional costs or lost Scottish Futures Trust income. Setting damages or service credits at pre-estimated costs/lost income is areasonable approach. Assuming there are no mitigating circumstances, it issuggested that authorities should not cap the concessionaire’s liability for failure tomeet agreed migration milestones. However, authorities should also consider the •If the network expansion plan is not delivered on time, there is risk that the authoritymay not be able to comply with the conditions set out its grant offer letter. Despitethe network expansion plan being delivered late the authority is unlikely to incur aloss; therefore, authorities should take advice as to the appropriateness of theapplication of damages or service credits for late delivery and what level such 6.0Performance Deductions •In some sectors it is common for there to be a cap on the value of financialdeductions which can be made in respect of poor performance.•In an EV charge point concession if the service is not available the concessionairewill not be generating income from the contract. Therefore, it will be important thatany financial deductions that are levied via the KPI framework are limited to wherethe authority experiences a loss of service.•Capping of performance deduction payments to the authority shouldn’t operate soas to insulate the concessionaire from financial risk. Any performance d

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