您的浏览器禁用了JavaScript(一种计算机语言,用以实现您与网页的交互),请解除该禁用,或者联系我们。[国际货币基金组织]:资本控制、风险与公司绩效:来自公司债券发行的跨国证据 - 发现报告

资本控制、风险与公司绩效:来自公司债券发行的跨国证据

AI智能总结
查看更多
资本控制、风险与公司绩效:来自公司债券发行的跨国证据

Capital Controls, Risk,and Firm Performance Cross-country Evidence fromCorporate Bond Issuance Andrea Fabiani, Andrés Fernández and Nimisha Gupta WP/25/193 IMF Working Papersdescribe research inprogress by the author(s) and are published toelicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers arethose of the author(s) and do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,or IMF management. 2025SEP IMF Working PaperMCM Capital Controls, Risk, and Firm Performance: Cross-country Evidence from Corporate BondIssuancePrepared by Andrea Fabiani (Bank of Italy), Andrés Fernández (IMF) and Nimisha Gupta (U. ofChicago)* Authorized for distribution byThordavur OlafssonSeptember2025 IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearch in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT:We study how controls on capital inflows impact firms’ financing and real outcomes inemerging markets using a novel dataset that merges firm-level bond issuance and balance sheet data withgranular measures of capital controls. We uncover a bond channel whereby a tightening of controls onnonresident purchases of domestically issued corporate bonds reduces the likelihood of subsequent bondissuance by about one-third of the historical average. This effect operates through two distinct channelslinked to the heterogeneous impact of these policies across firms’ characteristics: aprudentialchannel,where riskier, more leveraged firms curtail issuance more sharply, and aproductivitychannel, in whichmore productive firms also reduce issuance. Crucially, however, only the prudential channel persists whenanalyzing firms’ total liabilities and investment. Riskier firms reduce total liabilities and cut back oninvestment, while more productive firms maintain their investment plans by substituting away from bondmarkets, including via reduced dividend payouts. We further examine how these dynamics vary acrossdomestic vs. global financial cycles and across alternative measures of firm risk and productivity, and bydocumenting substitution margins via dividend payouts. We end with a discussion of the policyimplications of our findings. JEL Classification Numbers: Author’s E-Mail Address: Capital Controls, Risk, and FirmPerformance Cross-country Evidence from Corporate BondIssuance Prepared by Andrea Fabiani, Andrés Fernández and Nimisha Gupta Contents Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Data Sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10Main Variables and Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12Domestic and International Bond Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15Identification of the Effects of Capital Controls on Bond Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16Heterogeneous Effects Across Firms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17Real Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19Baseline Results: Domestic Bond Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19Heterogeneous Effect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20Real Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24Substitution with Alternative Sources of Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24Alternative Definitions of Profitability & Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26The Effects of Capital Controls Along the Financial Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27Conclusion . . . . .