反垄断执法与企业绩效：来自哥伦比亚食糖市场的证据

Produced by the Research Support TeamAbstractThe Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about developmentissues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry thenames of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely thoseof the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank andits affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.Policy Research Working Paper11155This paper examines the impact of two interventions byColombia’s competition authority to enforce competitionin the sugar market on firm performance in downstreamsectors. Using an exogenous identification strategy, theanalysis finds that following the competition authority’sintervention against collusion in 2015, downstream firmsexpanded production but did not increase productivity orprofitability margins, consistent with the removal of supplyconstraints imposed by cartelization. In contrast, the 2011intervention against abuse of dominance increased theThis paper is a product of the Prosperity Vertical. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to itsresearch and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers arealso posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at jsampibravo@worldbank.organd evostroknutova@worldbank.org. profitability margins of downstream firms, without alteringproduction scale or labor intensity, consistent with inputprice reductions and stable consumer demand. Robustnesschecks, including propensity score matching, confirm thereliability of these findings. The results show that antitrustenforcement works through different channels, dependingon the type of anti-competitive behavior. The results alsohighlight the importance of targeted and continuous anti-trust enforcement in addressing market distortions. AntitrustEnforcementandFirmPerformance:EvidencefromColombia’sSugarMarket∗†JamesSampia,bandEkaterinaVostroknutovaaaTheWorldBank,U.S.bVrijeUniversiteitAmsterdam.TheNetherlandsKeywords:antitrustenforcement,competitionJELcodes:C91;C9Allmistakesareourown.ThefindingsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldBankoritsmembercountries.WewouldliketothankMatiasBusso,AnaCusolito,JanEeckhout,CharlJooste,AartKraay,WilliamMaloney,MarcelaMelendez,PaulPhumpiu,Denisse Pierola,Edgar Salgado,Andres Zambrano,and IDB seminar participants for theirvaluablecomments,aswellasAnaUrrutiaArietaforoutstandingresearchassistancewithdatacollection.Emailaddresses:jsampibravo@worldbank.org(J.Sampi,corresponding author),evostroknu-tova@worldbank.org(E.Vostroknutova) ∗† 1IntroductionThis paper looks at the effects of antitrust enforcement on firm- and industry-level perfor-mance, emphasizing production, employment and profitability effects. Research on compe-tition policy has been traditionally focused on price effects and consumer welfare [Gutierrezand Philippon, 2022, Cavenaile et al., 2021], with studies of productivity much less common.Studies that do take into account firm-level performance responses concentrated on com-petitive pressures stemming from international trade liberalization [Edmond et al., 2015,Mayer et al., 2021, Eslava et al., 2004, 2013, Bloom et al., 2015, Cusolito et al., 2023]. Fewerempirical studies explore the firm-level effects of domestic competition policy and antitrustenforcement, particularly in developing countries [Vostroknutova et al., 2025]. This paperrelates to this literature [Eeckhout, 2021, De Loecker et al., 2020, Backus, 2019], and goesfurther than existing empirical studies [Babina et al., 2023, Reed et al., 2022] by elicitingthe mechanism of impact of antitrust enforcement on firm performance.Since the seminal study by Posner [1970], only a few papers directly link competitionpolicy and firm-level outcomes; for example Kang [2025] studies the effect of cartel en-forcement on innovation investments of ICT firms in the US. The recent advances in theunderstanding of the impacts of various shocks on heterogeneous firms following Aghionet al. [2005] are yet to be applied to competition policy and its effects on firm-level out-comes.This paper analyzes two major interventions by Colombia’s Competition Authority, theSuperintendencia de Industria y Comercio (SIC), in the sugar market. The SIC serves asColombia’s principal competition authority, operating with full administrative, financial,and budgetary autonomy as established under Law 1340 of 2009.The SIC holds juris-diction over all sectors of the economy, including those overseen by specialized regulatoryagencies.The initiatio