关于国会预算办公室对房利美和房地美潜在变化的预算处理需要了解的七件事

JULY | 2025 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were chartered in 1938and 1970, respectively, as government-sponsored enter-prises (GSEs) to ensure a stable supply of credit formortgages nationwide. Government-sponsored enter-prises are private companies created by federal law tofulfill a specific purpose. In the case of Fannie Mae andFreddie Mac, that purpose is to facilitate the flow offunding for home loans by purchasing mortgages fromlenders, pooling them into mortgage-backed securities(MBSs), and selling the securities to investors along witha guarantee against most losses from defaults on theunderlying loans. 1.CBO projects that the GSEs’future mortgage guaranteeshave a budgetary costAn MBS created by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac enti- tles its purchaser to a share of the combined mortgagepayments from the pool of loans underlying the security.The GSEs guarantee that such payments will be madein full and on a timely basis—including covering missedpayments if borrowers default so MBS investors are notaffected. In return for providing that guarantee of pay-ment, the GSEs receive an up-front fee when an MBS iscreated and a yearly fee based on the outstanding princi-pal of the underlying mortgages. The GSEs’ net incomeresults mainly from the difference between the fees theycollect and the payments they make on defaulted loans. After operating independently for decades, the two GSEswere placed in federal conservatorships in 2008. Sincethen, they have been controlled by the Federal HousingFinance Agency (FHFA) and effectively owned by theDepartment of the Treasury (for details, seeBox 1 onpage 3). In January 2025, the FHFA announcedthat it will seek comments on options to end the GSEs’conservatorships.1 In most years—including every year since 2012—theamount that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac collect infees exceeds their costs to cover mortgage defaults. Butduring periods of financial stress, such as the housingcrisis of the late 2000s, the cost of defaults can exceedincome from fees, resulting in net losses for the GSEs. Tomanage those situations, the GSEs maintain reserves thatthey fund by selling shares of stock or by keeping earn-ings that would otherwise be paid to their shareholders asdividends. Those reserves are invested in liquid assets thatthey can sell quickly to meet payment obligations. This report addresses seven key issues that might arise asthe Congressional Budget Office estimates the budgetaryeffects of potential legislation or administrative actionsthat could result in selling the Treasury’s ownership stakein the GSEs and releasing them from government con-trol. In keeping with its standard practices, CBO assessesthe federal budgetary and economic effects of proposedpolicies but does not make policy recommendations. CBO estimates that the new mortgages Fannie Maeand Freddie Mac are projected to guarantee during the2026−2035 period would have a total cost to the federalgovernment of $81.8 billion.2That baseline estimatereflects CBO’s projections of the default payments andfees that would occur if current laws governing revenues GSEs are projected to issue a total of about $15 trillionin new guarantees during that period. With such largeportfolios of mortgages, a modest underpricing ofrisk can result in a budgetary cost of tens of billionsof dollars. Contents 1. CBO projects that the GSEs’ future mortgageguarantees have a budgetary cost12. CBO treats the GSEs as if they were part ofthe government23. Releasing the GSEs from government control wouldresult in both federal savings and federal costs54. CBO projects the budgetary effects of the GSEs’mortgage guarantees on a fair-value basis75. CBO’s baseline budget projections and cost estimatesincorporate administrative and judicial actions86. CBO would incorporate the cost of the Treasury’s implicitor explicit commitments to the GSEs in cost estimates87. CBO’s estimate of the proceeds from selling the Treasury’sshares in the GSEs would depend on many factors9Appendix:Illustrative Policies to Recapitalize theGSEs and Release Them From Federal Control11Glossary of Terms Related to Fannie Mae andFreddie Mac15Box1.The Treasury’s Ownership Stake in Fannie Mae andFreddie Mac3 2.CBO treats the GSEs as if theywere part of the governmentIn CBO’s assessment, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are effectively part of the federal government for two rea-sons.4First, the FHFA gained operational control of theGSEs when it put them in conservatorships.That controlwas evident, for example, in March 2025, when theFHFA changed the membership of the GSEs’ boards ofdirectors. Second, the federal government gained major-ity ownership of the GSEs when the Treasury acquiredsenior preferred shares in the enterprises—and warrantsto buy their common shares in the future—in exchangefor agreeing to maintain their solvency (seeBox 1).For those reasons, CBO’s baseline budget projectionsaccount for the GSEs’ operations as though they arebeing conducted by a federal agency. Because CBO