世界银行-叙利亚宏观财政评估

Middle East and North Africa RegionSYRIAMacro-FiscalAssessmentJune 2025 ©2025 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank1818 H Street NWWashington DC 20433Telephone: 202-473-1000Internet:www.worldbank.orgThis work is a product of the staff of The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this workdo not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent.The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or currency of the data included in this work and does notassume responsibility for any errors, omissions, or discrepancies in the information, or liability with respect to the use of orfailure to use the information, methods, processes, or conclusions set forth. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and otherinformation shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legalstatus of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.Nothing herein shall constitute or be construed or considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunitiesof The World Bank, all of which are specifically reserved.Rights and PermissionsThe material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, thiswork may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given.Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The WorldBank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org.Further permission required for reuse.Publication design and layout by The Word Express, Inc. TABLE OF CONTENTSAcknowledgementExecutive Summary1.Economic Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1A. Real Sector and Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1B. Poverty and Labor Market Impact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6C.External Sector & Sanctions Impact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9D.Exchange Rate & Inflation Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14E. Fiscal Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17F.Debt Composition and Sustainability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19G. Financial Sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .202.Economic Outlook. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23AnnexSyria: Selected Economic Indicators (2008–2024)References vvii2731 SYRIA: MACRO-FISCAL ASSESSMENTList of FiguresFigure 1Figure 2Figure 3Figure 4Figure 5Figure 6Figure 7Figure 8Figure 9Figure 10Figure 11Figure 12Figure 13Figure 14Figure 15Figure 16Figure 17Figure 18Figure 19Figure 20Figure 21Figure 22Figure 23Figure 24List of TablesTable 1Table 2Table 3Table 4List of BoxesBox 1 FourteenYears ofConflict HaveDevastated the SyrianEconomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2EconomicActivityHasContractedacrossSectorssince theOnset of theConflict. . . . . . . . .3Changes in GDPEstimates, byGovernorate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4IdiosyncraticGrowthDynamics in SyrianProvinces in thePost-ConflictPeriod. . . . . . . . . . . .4Conflict andSanctionsHaveProfoundlyReshaped Syria’sEconomicStructure. . . . . . . . . . .5TheConflictHasLed to aCollapse inBothPrivate andPublicInvestments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6NighttimeLightDataIndicate aModerateDecline inEconomicActivityduringtheTransitionofControl. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6ConflictDynamics in SyriaHaveLed to aMajorShift inEconomicControl. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7ExtremePovertyHasIncreasedSubstantiallyover thePastDecade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7TheIncrease inLaborForceParticipationHasCompensated fortheDemographicShockInduced byConflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8TheConflictHasResulted in aDramaticChange in theJobProfile of SyrianWorkers. . . . . .9Conflict-RelatedDisruptions andSanctionsHaveDriven aCollapse ofForeignTrade,EspeciallyExports,since 2011. . . . . . . . . .