欧洲公用事业与清洁能源：受监管网络估值深度解析

Regulated Networks Primer series: Part 2: A deep-dive intovaluation Many of our team Top Picks for 2026 are regulated networks or allocating significant capexto these businesses. Given investor interest, we have launched the Regulated NetworksPrimer Series - in Part 1 we analysed the attractiveness of regulation across jurisdictions andin this Part 2, we deep-dive into valuation. Deepa Venkateswaran, ACA+44 20 7676 6990deepa.venkateswaran@bernsteinsg.com Bartlomiej Kubicki+49 69 717 4418bartlomiej.kubicki@bernsteinsg.com Premium to RAB introduction:Regulated utilities are best analysed by reference tothe premium to Regulated Asset Base (RAB) metric, comparing the enterprise valueof a company (less the EV attributable to any unregulated assets) to the RAB. The RABrepresents the regulator’s assessment of the capital employed in the regulated activity onwhich the utility is entitled to earn a return, and is therefore the economic foundation of aregulated utility. Companies which are able to beat the cost of capital and/or have stronggrowth prospects are likely to trade at a premium to RAB, whilst companies with limitedgrowth prospects and/or poor performance can be expected to trade at a discount. Jorge Alonso Suils+34 915 893 913jorge.alonso@bernsteinsg.com Rory Graham-Watson+44 20 7676 7093rory.graham-watson@bernsteinsg.com Drivers of RAB premium:Assuming acceptable returns, companies withstrong growthprospectsare likely to trade at a premium to RAB given the future value that will becaptured by existing shareholders. Within supportive regulatory frameworks, utility capexplans are often visible and predictable on timeframes extending for typically 5 years at atime. Even in the absence of growth, regulated utilities operating in frameworks which offergenerous base returnson capital are also likely to trade at a premium to RAB. Finally,companies operating under frameworks which offer a credible path to supplementingbase returns viaoperational and financial outperformanceare also likely to trade at apremium to RAB, given the value creation implied. Ken-Ree Choong+44 20 7676 8243ken-ree.choong@bernsteinsg.com Thibault Dujardin, CFA+33 1 58 98 59 16thibault.dujardin@bernsteinsg.com Specialist Sales Gareth Williams+44 20 7762 5256gareth.b.williams@bernsteinsg.com Bond proxies?We frequently hear that regulated utilities are simple bond proxies,making them unattractive in times of rising rates. In this note we set out both a theoreticalframework for why this is not the case, and long-runempirical evidence across multipleregulatory jurisdictions showing an at-best ambiguous relationship between yieldsand valuations. As highlighted in the first part of this primer series, European regulatoryframeworks vary widely in the protections they offer against changing costs of capital,with the most generous (e.g. Belgium and the UK) offering rapid pass-through. In any case,returns will be reset at least every 5 years. Do dividend yields matter?Given the elevated growth opportunities available particularlyin electricity transmission in some jurisdictions such as Germany and UK, we observe thatdividend pay-outs (and yields) are inversely co-related to growth. Given this wide dispersionin pay-out ratios among regulated utilities, we conclude that the dividend yield is not areliable valuation anchor. Are the P/E and RAB premium correlated? TheRAB premium may not be directlycorrelated with traditional valuation metrics, e.g. P/E ratios, driven by distortionsbetween IFRS and regulatory earnings (due to fast-money or high regulatory depreciation),an imperfect pass through of costs (e.g. example interest costs) or treatment of inflation(included in RAB in real regimes and earnings in nominal regimes). BERNSTEIN TICKER TABLE INVESTMENT IMPLICATIONS Regulated utilities are best analysed by reference to the premium to regulated asset base (RAB) metric, which compares theenterprise value of a company (less the EV attributable to any unregulated assets) to the RAB. Realised returns (vs cost ofcapital) and growth are the key levers driving premium or discount to RAB. Other things being equal, based on empirical data,we find a reasonable co-relation between attractiveness of the regulatory regime (which drives realized returns) and/growthand premia to RAB. Of course from time to time company specific idiosyncratic risks or regulatory uncertainty ahead of aregulatory review can impact RAB premia. On the point of whether regulated utilities are bond-proxies, long-run empirical evidence across multiple regulatory jurisdictionsshows an at-best ambiguous relationship between yields and regulated utility valuation. Moreover, many regulatory jurisdictionsnow have dynamic allowed cost of capital adjustments which mitigate against overall changes in the interest rate environment,weakening the relationship further. We find that dividend yields are not a relevant valuation anchor as there is an inverse correlation between RAB growth