Contents Key Findings4 Introduction5The West–China Corridor11The West–De-Risking Countries Corridor15The Transatlantic Corridor17The US–GCC Corridor19 Conclusion Lazard Geopolitical Advisory Senior Advisors Gen.Michael“Erik” Kurilla(ret.)Senior Advisor Jami MiscikSenior Advisor Adm. WilliamMcRaven (ret.)Senior Advisor Sir StephenLovegroveSenior Advisor Ronald TempleChief MarketStrategist PatrickMcHenrySenior Advisor Senior Leadership TheodoreBunzelHead of LGA &Managing Director Dr. SiddharthMohandasManagingDirector Lazard Geopolitical Advisory Team Aily ZhangGeopoliticalStrategist Sienna TompkinsGeopoliticalStrategist Carlos PetersenVice President Jacob JohnsonDirector Alice BaudinGeopoliticalAnalyst TJ NzewiGeopoliticalStrategist Trenton StoneGeopoliticalStrategist Report Contributors:Theodore Bunzel, Siddharth Mohandas,and Ron TempleLead Authors:Aily Zhang and Alice Baudin New York30 Rockefeller PlazaNew York,NY 10112United States+1 212 632 6000 About Geopolitical Advisory Paris175 Bd Haussmann75008 ParisFrance+ 33 1 44 13 01 11 London20 Manchester SquareLondon W1U 3PZUnited Kingdom+44 20 7187 2000 LazardGeopoliticalAdvisoryblendsleadinggeopoliticalinsightswithunmatched expertise in financial advisory,advising clients on how geopolitical trendstranslate into business impact. San Francisco Austin Tokyo Sanno Park Tower25th Floor11-1 Nagatacho 2-chomeChiyoda-ku Tokyo100-6125Japan+81 3 5511 6011 200 West 6th StSuite 1650Austin,TX 78701United States+1 512 652 2600 4 Embarcadero Center24th FloorSan Francisco,CA 94111United States+1 415 623 5000 Todiscuss this report or how LazardGeopolitical Advisory could support you,contactgeopoliticaladvisory@lazard.com. Key Findings 1Geopolitical competition is reshaping the global landscape for cross‑border investment andmergers and acquisitions (M&A),influencing how capital is deployedalong key regional corridors.Asmajor powers deploy a broader and more discretionary set of economic statecraft toolsliketariffs, exportcontrols, investment screening, sanctions,anddata‑governance regimes,corporates now operate in anenvironment where economic and national security priorities increasingly determine where capital can move,how deals are structured, and which sectors remain accessible. 2US and Europeaninvestmentin Chinahasundergone the most pronounced retrenchment,driven by heightened strategic friction, expanded export controls, and more assertive investmentscreening regimes in the United States and Europe.China’s own regulatory tightening, capital‑controlmeasures, and evolving industrial policy have further constrained two‑way flows.That said,sectoralexceptions persist;transactions where theUSis acquiring Chinesehealthcare and biotechassetshaveaccelerated since 2020, driven largely by licensing agreements that allow US firms to access Chineseinnovation without full ownership exposure. 3US and European capitalisbeingreallocatedfrom China toward emerging “de-risking hubs”likeSoutheastAsia, India, and Mexico,wheregreenfieldforeign direct investment(FDI)hasrisen intechnology‑intensive sectors, particularly computers and electronics.Thisshiftreflects both policy-drivenincentives (i.e., export controls, friendshoring frameworks, industrial subsidies) and market-drivensupplychain diversification,though many of theseproduction networksremainpartlyexposed to Chineseinputs, technology, or capital. 4The TransatlanticM&Acorridor remainsresilient,butFDIshows early signs of caution.Nearlyhalf ofeach ofUS and European cross-border M&A occurs between the two markets,anchored by deepinstitutional alignment and integration in sectors such as healthcare and electronics. However, recentgreenfieldFDI trends show early signs of caution: US greenfield investmentprojectsintoEurope haveslowedsince 2022,whileEuropean FDIprojectsinto the US fellfrom2024,potentiallyreflecting shifting industrialpriorities and debates over strategic autonomy. 5US–Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC)capital flows remain episodic on the M&A side,dominatedby high-profile megadeals in AI, digital infrastructure, and entertainment,but are gradually deepeningthrough two-way FDIin strategic sectors.Gulf states deploy sovereign capital,favorable regulatoryframeworks,andabundant energyto position themselves as global hubs for data center infrastructure, cloudcomputing, and next-generation digital industries under nationaltransformation agendas such as SaudiVision 2030 and the UAE’s AI strategy.However, the conflictwithIran exposes the vulnerability of this model,as attacksonenergy infrastructure, technology assets, and tourismaffectGCC economies and riskundermining the region’s safe-haven reputation, potentially weighing on future investment. 6Taken together, these patterns point to a global investment systemincreasingly influenced bygeopolitical alignment, industrial policy, and supply chain resilience, requiring corporates tofactorgeopolitical considerations into investment decisions and dealma