睿咨得能源展望报告 - 第二版：当前供应过剩，未来格局分化

Surplus now. Divergence later Surplus now. Divergence later The global energy system is entering a two-phasecycle. In the near term, markets are defined byabundance. In the longer term, by tighteningsupply, rising marginal costs and geopolitical headline prices coexist with rising marginal costsand increasing geopolitical risk premium. Thesystem remains exposed to shocks, even if near- term balances appear comfortable. Prices willstabilize, with Henry Hub in the $4-$5 per MMBturange on a real term basis from now until 2040,and TTF and Asia LNG spot between $7 and $12per MMBtu. Over the next one to two years, markets remaincomfortably supplied, barring major geopoliticaldisruptions. Higher OPEC output, LNG capacityadditions led by the US, and solar PV oversupply inChina keep prices contained. This temporary glutsuppresses investment signals and reinforces the On the power markets side, renewables andstorage continue to scale up. Solar remains thedominant source of new capacity globally, evenafter modest downward revisions linked tostructural changes in China. Wind presents a moremixed picture, with slower onshore deployment outside China and persistent cost-related offshorechallenges. Coal capacity remains broadly stable, Oil illustrates the tension most clearly. Demandplateaus in the early 2030s on the back of road transport electrification led by China. Yet, production decline rates remain relentless and willsqueeze supply, with roughly $8 trillion inupstream investment required through 2040 tomatch demand. Nearly half of this will be directedtoward shale and deepwater, both capital-intensive and technically complex resource types.As Tier-1 US shale inventory depletes anddeepwater peaks in the early 2030s, the system Batteries are the fastest-growing clean technologysegment. Global demand exceeds 3 TWh by 2030,driven by electric vehicles (EVs), power storageand heavy transport electrification. Battery costsare declining toward cost parity with gasgeneration in multiple markets. As oil prices trendstructurally higher in the 2030s, electrification shifts away from the US-led growth model of thepast decade. Outside core OPEC producers, muchof global supply trends downward. This leads us toone of our key theses in this House View report #2:A significant share of the 2030s output will depend Meanwhile, geopolitics emerges as a major factor influencing the evolution of the energy systems.Supply chains are increasingly shaped by strategicgeopolitical objectives rather than pure economicoptimization, like it had been during the first twodecades of globalization in this century, anddefense spending is rising alongside uncertainty.Often, energy security considerations override Gas follows a different but related dynamic.Demand is stronger than we assumed in HouseView #1, led by policy changes in the US andpersistent acceleration in power demand driven bydata centers. In the near term, gas supports powersystems facing renewable intermittency, gridconstraints and AI-driven data center demand.Over time, industrial growth in emerging marketsand energy-security considerations broaden its China and the US exemplify this divergence andthe impact of geopolitics. The former isconsolidating its role as an electro and renewablesuperpower, leveraging electrification and clean The latter is reinforcing its position as an oil andgas superpower, expanding output and usingenergy leverage with allies and rivals to try andkeep the production costs low and trade flowsrobust. The regime change in Venezuela is perhapsan early sign in this direction, as its immense oil In sum, the current phase of energy abundance istransient. It reduces immediate price pressure butdiscourages investment in the very supply requiredto sustain the system in the 2030s. As low-cost oilresources deplete and geopolitical fragmentation Surplus now. More fragmented, more complex,and divergent energy systems later. Two superpowers, two strategies, two divergentenergy systems. In the background, themacroeconomic outlook remains constructive butthat too is uneven and faces both downside andupside risks. AI offers productivity upside while introducing labor-market dislocation. Tariffs haveso far been tolerated, but tend to injectnegotiations-related uncertainty, and might trigger Claudio GalimbertiChief Economist Global energy demand set toreach 720 EJ in 2040 roughly 165Bcmabove our previous House View.This upward revision is largely driven by a moreconstructive outlook for gas in the US powersector, where it is expected to continue displacingcoal and complement variable renewablegeneration. This highlights the role of gas as atransition fuel in markets prioritizing reliability and Global primary energy demand reached anestimated 657 EJ in 2025, up from 648 EJ in 2024,highlighting continued growth in consumptiondespite efficiency gains and structural change.While growth is expected to moderate, ouroutlook indicates that primary energy deman