霍尔木兹海峡船舶过境安全管理行业指南

IMPORTANT NOTICE. This document complements BMP MS by providing guidance to vesselowners/operators. It is intended to support voyage-specific threat & risk assessment, facilitating safe shipboardand office planning. It does not replace company procedures, Master's professional judgment and overridingauthority, flag State or coastal State requirements, charterparty obligations, insurance advice or current officialnaval and governmental guidance. Produced and supported by: 1. Purpose and Scope This guidance has been prepared to assist in planning and safely managing all vessel transits into, within, orout of the Gulf region where a transit through the Strait of Hormuz may be required during periods ofheightened regional security risk. It should be read in conjunction with the latest version of the BestManagement Practices for Maritime Security (BMP-MS) 2. Guiding Principles •The safety of life, safe navigation and protection of environment remain the primary considerations,with Masters having overriding authority. Transit decisions should be based on fresh, continuallyupdated voyage-specific assessments.•The Master, Company Security Officer (CSO), shore management and Ship Security Officer (SSO)should maintain a shared and constantly updated operational picture before and during transit.•Guidance should be drawn from official, trusted sources, including JMIC, UKMTO,MSCIO/EUNAVFOR, BMP Maritime Security, relevant military advisories, specialist securityconsultants and applicable Flag instructions.•When based on the latest security threat assessment, should the risk be increased, then deferment oftransit should be considered a safer option.•Where applied to passenger vessels operating without passengers, the guidance should beinterpreted in light of having reduced onboard personnel, albeit with unchanged safety and regulatoryobligations.•Tosupport safe decision-making under pressure, recognise that human performance is affected byworkload, stress, fatigue and environmental conditions. Transit planning and execution should aim totake into account the potential for “performance impacts” and put in place mitigation measures, 2.1 Threat Assessment Vessels operating in these waters are advised to conduct a specific pre-voyage/operation threatand risk assessment, incorporate appropriate protective measures into vessel security plans,exercise heightened caution and monitor VHF Channel 16 at all times. In the event of attack,incident or suspicious activity, the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) should be activated and theUnited Kingdom Maritime Trade Office (UKMTO) notified. 2.2 Extreme Congestion Traffic Conditions When a transit window opens – particularly following a period of restriction or heightened threat – the followingconditions may develop rapidly: Planning Consideration: During extreme traffic congestion periods, collision and grounding risks maymaterially increase. Both dimensions must be appropriately addressed in the pre-transit planning. 3. Current Operating Context Conditions affecting merchant shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) can change rapidly. Thisenvironment may include kinetic threats, electronic interference, reporting uncertainty and periods ofcompressed, or unpredictable, traffic flow at various speeds. AIS spoofing has been used by attackers placingfake AIS echoes in the vicinity of the course-line in an attempt to trigger course and/or speed changesdesirable by the attackers. Visual and radar observations must be prioritised to effectively mitigate that risk. Even when the SoH TSS waterway is open, operational conditions may be degraded by: •GNSS jamming or spoofing.•AIS anomalies and false target injection (AIS spoofing).•Heavy traffic concentration and reduced decision margins within or near the Traffic SeparationScheme (TSS). •Stress-driven manoeuvring by surrounding vessels.•Some vessels operating at low crewing levels with limited spare crew redundancy (fatigue and restmanagement), limiting quality of watch and efficiency of emergency response.•Unmanned surface vessel (USV/WBIED) attack, combat swimmer sabotage and limpet mine threatsagainst stationary and transiting vessels, small craft in attack or harassment mode.•Errant mines not detected during original clearance ops.•Missile/drone attacks including unexploded ordnance (UXO) hazards on board following drone ormissile strikes.•Shoreside stand-off weapon attacks.•Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) by UAVs/quadcopters conducting surveillance ofports and anchorages. These conditions may occur simultaneously, creating a high workload and high-stress operating environment.The combined effect of these factors can reduce the quality of situational awareness and its interpretation,with consequent impacts on communication and decision-making. In such environments, situationalawareness may erode, particularly where conditions are novel or rapidly changing, making it more difficult torecognise p