欧洲未来2050：贸易政策

Europe of the Future 2050 –trade policy Alan Wm. Wolff Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) To ensure timely dissemination, the “Europe 2050” papers are publishedwithout editing or typesetting. These contributions will subsequently formthe basis of CEPR Paris Report 5, to be published at a later stage andedited by Olivier Blanchard, Pascal Lamy, Enrico Letta, and BeatriceWeder di Mauro. Europe of the Future 2050 – trade policy Alan Wm. Wolff, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE). It is vitally important that the EU take a central leadership role in the shaping of theworld trading system of the future. The need for strong leadership has not been as apparent sincethe period of post-war economic planning in 1944 at Bretton Woods and in the conferences thatled to the drafting of the Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO)iand the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Because the US has chosen to resort to a power-basedapproach to trade and because China, the world’s largest trading country, chooses to rely on ahigh degree of state involvement in its economy, it falls to the European Union to take the lead inworking with others to consider how to shape the future of the world trading system based onvalues it shares with others subscribing to the liberal international order. Having the primarycapacity to fulfill this role, it is its responsibility to do so. The proposed European role If the EU takes the lead, it would not be alone. There are many who would join it andwork with it: The international progressives, the mid-sized economies positively disposedtoward trade, starting with a nucleus of Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, theUnited Kingdom, and South Korea, and branching out over time to Brazil, Costa Rica, Uruguay,potentially Indonesia, as well as forward leaning Southeast Asian participants and several of themore active Latin American countries.A beginning may be made through a combination of theEU and members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Atlantic Partnership (CPTPP).iiCanadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has given voice to the proposition that the middle powershave agency which they must now exercise: ...the question today for middle powers like us is whether we establish the conventionsand write the new rules that will determine our security and prosperity or let the hegemons dictate outcomes. In the new global environment, the ability to form effectivecoalitions is becoming a central strategic capability.iii Collective leadership is needed. The EU must help set the pace. The convoy system,proceeding at the speed of the slowest, is no longer acceptable if timely progress is to be made. The foundations of EU leadership Caveats: the EU will not be entirely free to pursue the trade policy of its choice, and theone recommended in this paper, without having met to a substantial degree four prerequisites: 1)Geopolitical standing. Europe must work to gain sufficient geopolitical status to avoidhaving key aspects of its trade policy dictated by either or both superpowers, the UnitedStates and China. Both powers have at times pursued coercive trade policies that arecontrary to optimal policy choices for the EU. Since EU status approaching that of ageopolitical superpower cannot be achieved overnight, there will be some compromisesthat will have to be made, but that does not prevent its envisioning a desired trade policyand then assessing how best to deliver it. 2)The single market.A second precondition for pursuit of an optimal European tradepolicy is that the EU must perfect its single market. The recent Enrico Letta reportiv,quoting IMF studies, argues that the tariff equivalent of the friction of moving productsfrom one EU Member State is the equivalent for goods of a 44% tariff (three times morethan in the US)v. For services the tariff equivalent is 100%. Conducting a trade policyfrom a position of strength is not a matter solely of having a single defense military forcefor the 27 members but also having a true single market. Within the EU, the costs fromregulatory divergence, public procurement barriers, a fragmented services markets,professional licensing restrictions, and perhaps more fundamental issues such as the lackof a Capital Markets Union, need to be overcome. 3)Coherence.The third precondition for the pursuit of an optimal trade policy is that the EUhave the attributes, to the extent possible, of a single state when addressing trade policy formulation. The subjects for trade negotiations have broadened very substantially. Thereis a myriad of regulatory jurisdictions both within the Commission and at the level ofmember states that impinge on trade aspects of other policy venues, including investment,health (given the all too real threats of pandemics), competition policy, industrial policy,farm policy, digital policy, and the deployment of Artificial Intelligence (AI), to name afew