全球投资组合经理摘要：价格合理

The Price is Right We provide context and perspective on research acrossregions and asset classes. This week, we examine US equityvaluations using the Schiller-CAPE ratio, analyze the growingliquidity imbalance in the Treasury market and opine onpotential downside risks to earnings in Europe. Equity Product Management Group Terence Malone*+ 1 212 526 7578terence.malone@barclays.comBCI, US Rob Bate*+44 (0)20 7773 3576rob.bate@barclays.comBarclays, UK •Valuations through a Schiller-CAPE Lens:In our view, despite elevated Schiller-CAPEreadings, current US equity valuations remain attractive, with the S&P 500 trading at ~19xNTM EPS, versus our expectation of ~15% EPS growth in 2026, supported by an improvingmacro backdrop; resilient Tech-led earnings growth; and a capex "supercycle" acrosshyperscalers, energy, and defense. Big Tech has de-rated materially and the rest of the S&P500 trades at a discount to our macro-based fair value estimate. And while we acknowledgeconcerns over private credit and geopolitical instability in the Middle East, we believe neitherwill derail the growth cycle. While CAPE levels near 38x echo past market peaks in 1999 and2021 and suggest potential systemic risk, today’s environment features a relatively steadierFed, improved financial conditions, and still-constructive earnings momentum and revisions,all of which are incrementally more supportive of risk assets. Also, CAPE may cast falsewarnings in fast-changing secular growth regimes, due to its anchoring to long-run inflation-adjusted earnings. In fact, we find the semiconductor industry to be a good example of this: a3-year "quasi-CAPE" calculated for the SOX Index shows little relationship with forwardreturns over the past several decades, due to rapid EPS growth over the trailing window, animportant consideration for US equities as a whole in the age of AI. FICC Product Management GroupJennifer Cardilli*+1 212 526 8351jennifer.cardilli@barclays.comBCI, US Jill Nentwig*+ 1 212 526 5129jillian.nentwig@barclays.comBCI, US •Policy Support and the Treasury Market:Stability in Treasury and financing marketsremains a concern for policy makers and investors, particularly in light of potential changes tothe size and composition of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. Much of the recent focus is Thisdocument is intended for institutional investors and is not subject to all of theindependence and disclosure standards applicable to debt research reports prepared for retailinvestors under U.S. FINRA Rule 2242. Barclays trades the securities covered in this report for itsown account and on a discretionary basis on behalf of certain clients. Such trading interestsmay be contrary to the recommendationsofferedin this report. Barclays Capital Inc. and/or one of itsaffiliatesdoes and seeks to do business with companiescovered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have aconflict of interest that couldaffectthe objectivity of this report. Investors should consider thisreport as only a single factor in making their investment decision. * This individual is a member of the Product Management Group and is not a Research Analyst All research referenced herein has been previously published. You can view the full reports,including analyst certifications and other important disclosures, by clicking the hyperlinks inthis publication or by going to our Research portal on Barclays Live. FOR ANALYST CERTIFICATION(S) PLEASE SEE PAGE 25.FOR IMPORTANT EQUITY RESEARCH DISCLOSURES, PLEASE SEE PAGE 25.FOR IMPORTANT FIXED INCOME RESEARCH DISCLOSURES, PLEASE SEE PAGE 26.Completed: 02-Apr-26, 23:35 GMTReleased: 05-Apr-26, 13:00 GMTRestricted - External on adjustments to various bank regulations and ratios, such as relaxing the leverage ratio,which are designed to increase the capacity for intermediation of low-risk assets. However,the underlying source of instability is structural: since the GFC, the Treasury market hasgrown far faster than the quantum of bank capital. A first implication of this structuralimbalance is that any technical adjustments to bank regulation provide, at most, temporaryrelief, so long as the growth of the Treasury market outpaces bank capital, and we see noreason why that will reverse. The second implication is that banks' preference for reserveswill be hard to shake. Third, this imbalance increases the need forofficialinterventions tostabilize markets during periods of volatility. In other words, Treasury market dysfunction is agrowing risk to the financial system. As a result, market stability is becoming (or already is) a"liability" of the Fed. This creates a vicious cycle: expectations of intervention can becomeself-reinforcing if they result in greater use of leverage and, thus, more risk of disorderlyunwinds. •Earnings Downside in Europe?European consensus FY26 EPS remains relatively resilient sofar, but we believe that the consensus has not yet reflected the fulleffectof the Ira