2023年银行业动荡的教训——执行摘要

Lessons from the 2023 banking turmoil – Executive Summary The banking turmoil that started in March 2023 was the most significant period of banking stress sincethe Great Financial Crisis that began in 2007. Credit Suisse, a Swiss global systemically important bank,along with three regional banks in the United States,1with total assets exceeding USD 1 trillion, were eithershut down, put into receivership or rescued. These failures triggered a crisis of confidence in banks’resilience and led to wide-scale public support measures. Against this background, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published a report assessingthecauses of the banking turmoil,the lessons learned and possible regulatory and supervisoryresponses.2 Since then, it has pursued initiatives to: •strengthen supervisory effectiveness by identifying issues that could benefit from additionalglobal guidance and by developing practical tools to support supervisors in their day-to-daywork3•conduct analytical work to assess whether specific features of the Basel Framework performed asintended during the turmoil This Executive Summary outlines the main lessons for supervision and regulation as identified in the BCBSreport. It also presents the work under way to strengthen supervisory effectiveness regarding thesupervision of liquidity risk and interest rate risk in the banking book, the assessment of the sustainabilityof banks’ business models and the importance of effective supervisory judgment. Lessons for supervision The BCBS report identifies lessons for supervision relating to the supervisory assessment of banks’ businessmodels, governance and risk management; the exercise of supervisory judgment; the need for effectivesupervisory tools; the supervision of liquidity; and the importance of cross-border cooperation and ofmanaging risk at both consolidated and legal entity level. Business model, governance and risk management analysis Despite their diverse business models, the banks that failed in 2023 shared common weaknesses inbusiness strategies, governance and risk management practices and were outliers compared with theirpeers. These failures highlight the need for supervisors to: •assess the short- and medium-term viability and sustainability of a bank’s business model, as wellas the quality and adequacy of its governance and risk management. This requires going beyondregulatory ratios and using forward-looking, risk-adjusted profitability measures 1Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank of New York and First Republic Bank. For a description of the main events leading up to theMarch 2023 banking turmoil, see the BCBS’sReport on the 2023 banking turmoil, October 2023.2See the BCBS’sReport on the 2023 banking turmoil, October 2023. A follow-up report to the Group of Twenty (G20) FinanceMinisters and Central Bank Governors –The 2023 banking turmoil and liquidity risk: a progress report– was published inOctober 2024.3These tools are informational resources. They do not change or replace existing standards or guidelines and are designed tostrengthen supervisory practices and effectiveness worldwide. •evaluate how changes in a bank’s environment, such as significant shifts in interest rates orregulatory adjustments, affect its ability to generate sustainable earnings over the medium tolong term•proactively engage with outlier banks to ensure they understand and can manage their risks. Theintensity of this engagement should align with the significance of the identified issues Effective supervisory judgment and need for effective tools Although supervisors identified issues and engaged with the banks that failed in 2023, their actions werenot timely or forceful enough to prevent failure. This underscores the limitations of rules-based supervisionand the need for early interventions, even when regulatory requirements are met. It also highlights theneed for additional monitoring tools and stress indicators, particularly for liquidity and interest rate risks. Supervision of liquidity risk The 2023 turmoil highlighted challenges in the supervision of banks’ liquidity risk, calling for supervisorsto consider whether and to what extent: •the monitoring of bank, sectoral and market information, along with liquidity supervisory reviewprocesses, provides relevant and timely information to identify material liquidity outflows•the frequency and scope of supervisory monitoring should be increased during both periods ofstress and business-as-usual times and whether additional information and high-frequency datashould be used•the business model’s features are adequately considered by the bank and the supervisor•Basel Framework liquidity monitoring tools are used effectively and complemented with otherstress indicators that account for business model specificities and banks’ interrelated activities•banks’ liquidity stress testing and contingency funding plans are sufficiently comprehensive androbust and whether they could be supplemented b