需要采取哪些措施来提高银行业联盟决议框架的效率

What needs to be done toimprove the efficiency ofthe resolution framework March 2026 JEL classification: G01, G18, G21, G33 Keywords:bank resolution,banking union,singleresolutionmechanism,simplification,efficiency, FSI Occasional Papers aim to contribute to international discussions on a wide range of topics of relevanceto the financial industry and its regulation and supervision. The views expressed in this publication are This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). To contact the BIS Global Media and PublicRelationsteam,pleaseemailmedia@bis.org.Youcansignupforemailalertsat Abstract The resolution framework of the banking union is a significant achievement that has proved capable ofmanaging idiosyncratic bank failures. However, certain features increase its complexity and undermine itsefficiency compared with the frameworks of other major jurisdictions. These features include cumbersomedecision-makingprocedures;detailed arrangements for coordination among EU/BU and nationalauthorities; granular and complex regulation, including rules on MREL calibration; and a complicatedinteraction with insolvency regimes. Unnecessary complexity has costs for firms and authorities. This Contents What needs to be done to improve the efficiency of the resolution framework of the banking union ........ 5 1.Introduction....................................................................................................................................................................... 5 1.Clarity in scope......................................................................................................................................................132.Proportionality ......................................................................................................................................................143.Smooth interaction between resolution and insolvency......................................................................164.Effective coordination between supervision and resolution ..............................................................175.Appropriate combination of rules and discretion...................................................................................186.Adequate and flexible toolkit..........................................................................................................................19 Annex............................................................................................................................................................................................29 United Kingdom......................................................................................................................................................................29 What needs to be done to improve the efficiency of the 1.Introduction The European banking union (BU) was created in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) thatbegan in 2007 and the euro area crisis that began in 2010. The GFC revealed the fiscal, economic andsocial costs of a lack of effective tools for managing the failure of systemic banks in a way that maintainstheircritical functions and protects financial stability without exposing taxpayers to loss.At the The euro area crisis highlighted the risks that a destabilising feedback loop between sovereignand financial risks posed to the very continuation of the European monetary union. Breaking the looprequired an institutional framework that would allow banks’ risk to be denationalised, ie delink the risksassociated with a bank’s liabilities from its geographical location within the monetary union. The banking That is the main objective of the single resolution mechanism (SRM), which is one pillar of thebanking union along with the single supervisory mechanism. The SRM, together with the Bank Recoveryand Resolution Directive (BRRD), implements the FSB Key Attributes in a way that is consistent with theobjectives of the banking union. In the decade that the SRM has been operating, resolution plans havebeen put in place for all significant banking institutions, the credibility and feasibility of those plans istested through regular resolvability assessments, European banks have built up loss-absorbing capacity to At the same time, experience has shown that the SRM has shortcomings that impede it fromachieving its core objectives. For example, the design of the framework and its funding arrangements werefactors that led in 2017 to the failure of two significant Italian banks – Banca Popolare di Vicenza and and the lack of a European deposit insurance scheme impair the crisis management framework andprevent the full denationalisation of banks’ risks within the banking union. Funding includes both liquidity,which is key to continuity of critical functions, and external mutualised financial support. By “external”, we Such shortcomings and their impact on the effectiveness of the current resolution framework arew