估算美国对国际货币基金组织承诺的预算成本：2026-02号工作文件

Estimating theBudgetaryCost ofU.S.Commitments Michael FalkenheimCongressionalBudget Officemichael.falkenheim@cbo.gov Youstiena ShafeekCongressional Budget Officeyoustiena.shafeek@cbo.gov Working Paper2026-02 February2026 To enhance the transparency of the work of the Congressional Budget Office and to encourage externalreview of that work, CBO’s working paper series includes papers that provide technical descriptions ofofficial CBO analyses as well as papers that represent independent research by CBO analysts. Papers in For valuable comments and discussionswithin CBO,wethank Christi Hawley Anthony, Sunita D’Monte,Sebastien Gay, JeffreyKling, Wendy Kiska, Kyoung Mook Lim, David Newman, MitchellRemy,PhillipSwagel, and David Torregrosa. Menzie Chinn of the University of Wisconsin–Madison, DesmondLachman of the American Enterprise Institute, Brent Neiman of the University of ChicagoBoothSchool of Business (formerly of the U.S. Treasury), and Linda Tesar of the University of Michiganalsooffered comments.Wealsothank staff from the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Gregory Basile,Shannon Ding,RebeccaLeaning, Alexander Leipziger, Travis Lindsay, and Steve Swartz) for valuable Abstract Usinga fair-value approach, the Congressional Budget Officeestimatesthe cost ofincreasingtheUnited States’financialcommitmentto the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Althoughcountries default much lessoftenon theIMFthan on otherlenders,thefundstill carries creditrisk.By design, the IMF lends to countries experiencing significant macroeconomic challenges.Private markets often avoid those borrowers.Evenwhenborrowing countries eventually repayloansthat fall intoarrears, the IMFstill experiences a financial burden. Thefundpassessomecostsof such defaultsto members through a “burdensharing” mechanism thatreducestheincome thatthe United Statesand other creditors receive on their contributions.In addition,theUnited Stateshashistoricallyoffered furthersupport to helpcountriesresolvetheiroverdue IMFdebts.CBOestimatesthe U.S.cost under current law byincorporatingaverage default costsand Keywords:International Monetary Fund, international finance, fair value, sovereign risk, fiscal JEL Classification:F33,F34, H81, H83 Notes Numbers in the text and tables may not sum to totals because of rounding. Unless otherwise specified, all dollar values are expressed in 2026dollars and all yearsrefer to Contents Introduction.....................................................................................................................................5Background on the IMF..............................................................................................................6U.S. Exposure to IMF Credit Losses..........................................................................................8Budgetary Treatment of the U.S. Commitment to the IMF........................................................9Related Literature......................................................................................................................12Overview of CBO’s Approach to Estimating the Cost of the U.S. Commitment to the IMF......13Lending and Interest Rates on Credit Default Swaps...................................................................15Lending Rate.............................................................................................................................15Interest Rate Spread on Credit Default Swaps..........................................................................16Adjustment for Correlation Between Lending Rate and CDS Spread......................................18Adjustment for Preferred Creditor Status.....................................................................................18Default Rates.............................................................................................................................20Loss Given Default...................................................................................................................24Premium for Market Risk.........................................................................................................31 Introduction Thispaperdescribes how the Congressional Budget Officeestimates thebudgetarycost oftheUnited States’commitmenttocontributemorefinancialresources tothe International MonetaryFund (IMF). The IMF is a global financial organization with 191member countries, tasked withpromoting financial stability and addressing balance-of-payments crises.Member contributions TheIMFfacescredit risk and passes costs on tomembercountrieswhen countriesborrowingfrom thefundfall into arrears on their obligations.The IMF benefits fromitsstatusas a preferredcreditor.That is,borrowerstypicallymake payments onIMF loansbeforeanyother obligationsto private lendersor to other countries.Sometimes,though,borrowersdo notmake theirscheduled payments on time,a situation referred to hereaseithera default orgoinginto arrears.Borrowersalm