基于品味的投资、政府政策与金融中介竞争（英）

Taste-based Investing,Government Policies andCompetition in FinancialIntermediation Damien Capelle WP/26/19 IMF Working Papersdescribe research inprogress by the author(s) and are published toelicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers arethose of the author(s) and do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,or IMF management. 2026JAN IMF Working PaperResearch Department Taste-based Investing, Government Policies and Competition in Financial IntermediationPrepared by Damien Capelle * Authorized for distribution by Maria Soledad Martinez PeriaJanuary 2026 IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT:This paper develops a theory of how investors’ tastes are transmitted to aggregate investmentthrough the market structure of financial intermediation. Whether tastes affect equilibrium capital allocationdepends on where they originate—from households or from intermediaries—and on the degree of competitionand segmentation in funding markets. Strong competition amplifies the pass-through of households’ tastes foramenity assets, but arbitrages away intermediaries’ own tastes. The same forces shape the effectiveness offinancial-sector policies targeting households or intermediaries. I apply and quantify the framework in thecontext of green finance. Taste-based Investing,Government Policies andCompetition in FinancialIntermediation Prepared by Damien Capelle 1Introduction Households and financial intermediaries care not only about the risk and return of theirinvested portfolios, but also about non-pecuniary considerations directly related to theactivities that they finance. This may be for ethical, environmental, social, politicalor geopolitical reasons. A prominent example is green investment. If households orfinancial intermediaries value the environmental impact of their investments, they maydemand a greater quantity of green assets (Barber, Morse, and Yasuda 2021; Bonnefonet al. 2020; Bauer, Ruof, and Smeets 2021; Kraussl, Oladiran, and Stefanova 2024). Ina context of low carbon pricing, an optimistic view in green finance is that preferencesalone could spontaneously direct funds away from dirty technologies, those that generatea lot of emissions, in favor of green technologies. Whether these tastes significantly shift capital allocation, however, depends on how theyinteract with the structure of financial intermediation, and the profit-driven competitiveforces in the markets for funds. In highly competitive financial systems, intermediarieswith tastes for some investments may be forced to hold return-maximizing portfoliosin order to retain funding, causing their tastes to be arbitraged away despite strongstated preferences. If tastes are to operate as complements to policies — for example ifgreen finance is to complement politically-constrained carbon pricing—it is crucial tounderstand when such motives of intermediaries and households transmit into significantinvestments or when they are arbitraged away in funding markets. This paper develops a theory of the transmission of investing tastes and financial-sectorpolicies to real investment through the market structure of financial intermediation.The key insight is that the transmission of tastes depends critically on where theyoriginate—from ultimate investors or from financial intermediaries—and on the marketstructure of financial intermediation,i.e.the degree of competition among intermediaries.Market structure determines whether and which tastes are passed through or arbitragedaway. The same forces also shape the effectiveness of government interventions: policiesthat target intermediaries—such as lighter capital requirements for financial intermedi-aries when they invest in amenity assets—or households—tax rebates to householdsbased on the share of amenity assets in intermediaries’ portfolios—likewise performdifferently across competitive environments and degrees of market segmentation. I introduce a tractable model with tastes for amenity assets and imperfectly competitivefinancial intermediaries. In the model, final production relies on two capital inputs that are imperfect substitutes. One input generates a negative externality and is thereforeoverused in the absence of corrective policy. Firms fund investment in each input byissuing financial assets purchased by financial intermediaries. In turn, intermediariescompete imperfectly for household savings in the market for funds. Both households—the ultimate investors—and intermediaries may derive utility directly from holdingassets that finance a particular type of activity. Assets that deliver such non-pecuniarybenefits are referred to asamenityassets. For example, in climate finan