移民作为社会保障？工作许可证市场的模拟

Quy-ToanDo,MichaelLokshin,andMartinRavallion Abstract Workershavetherighttotakeupanyjobofferintheircountryofcitizenshipbutnottorentoutthatright.Thispapershowsthatrelaxingthisrestrictionusingatwo-sidedcompetitivemarketinworkpermitscanprovideabasicincomeguaranteeforworkersinmigration-destinationcountries,financedbysellingtemporaryworkpermitstomigrantworkers.Regulatingthemarketbyimposingataxonworkpermitsnarrowsthesetofbeneficiaries,theincomeofwhichcanfurtherbecomplementedwiththerevenuesfromsuchtax.Substantial JELclassification:F22,J61,J68 Keywords:workpermits,migration,socialprotection,targeting,poverty 1.Introduction Whileevidencetodatesuggestslimited,ifany,impactsofmigrationonlocallabormarketsinhigh-incomecountries(see,e.g.,Card1990;OttavianoandPeri2012;Dustmann,Frattini,andPreston2013;NationalAcademiesofSciences,Engineering,andMedicine2017),many citizenssee migrant workers asa threattotheirlivingstandards.Politiciansoftenrespondtothesesentimentsbypromisingtocurbimmigration;theywouldalsoprovidesocialprotectiontoworkersaffectedbycompetitionwithmigrants.Thepaperproposesamarket-basedpolicytoolthatcouldaddressthecontinuingconcernsaboutthevulnerability Quy-ToanDo(correspondingauthor)isLeadEconomistintheDevelopmentResearchGroupoftheWorldBank;hisemailaddressisqdo@worldbank.org.MishaLokshinisLeadEconomistintheOfficeoftheChiefEconomistforEuropeandCentralAsiaattheWorldBank;hisemailaddressismlokshin@worldbank.org.MartinRavallionpassedawaybeforecompletingthispaper.TheauthorsaregratefultoDominiquevandeWalle,DeanJolliffe,AndreiLevchenko,RomanD.Zarate,participantsattheGeorgetownUniversity-WorldBankPovertyConference,andSylvieLambert(guesteditor),andtwoanonymousreferees itout.Ontheothersideofthenewmarket,time-boundworkpermitswouldbeavailableforpurchasetopeoplewithnorighttoworkinthedestinationcountry.Thepriceoftheworkpermit,therefore,would Suchamarketwouldhavebenefitsforbothoriginanddestinationcountries.Itwouldallowmigrantworkerstoaccesshigh-earningemploymentindestinationcountries.Inequilibrium,migrantworkerswouldbemoreproductivethanthedomesticoneswhohadsoldtheirworkpermits,hencecontributingtothedomesticeconomies.Finally,themarketmechanismleadsdomesticworkerstoself-selectintobeingbeneficiariesofsocialprotectiontransfersfinancedbythesaleofthesepermits.Thus,thepolicyprovidesaso-calledbasicincomeguarantee(BIG),definedasalevelofincomethateachworkerinthedestination Furthermore,theworkpermitistaxableandthetaxrateleviedbythegovernmentwouldbeakeypolicyinstrumentforthetargeting.Bytaxingworkpermits,thegovernmentaffectsthesizeofthemarket,hencedeterminingthesetofbeneficiaries.Whentherevenuesfromsuchtaxationaretransferredaslump- Thepaperprovidesatheoreticalmodelofamarketforworkpermits.Theterminologies“rentin”(resp.“rentout”)and“buy” (resp.“sell”)arehenceforthusedinterchangeably,sincethemodeldoesnothaveatimedimension.Yettheschemeofinterestinthispaperisamarketoftemporarytradeableworkpermits.Inthemodel,demandforworkpermitsisdrivenbyrisk-neutralworkersintheorigincountrywhocomparetheircurrentearningswiththeirexpectedearnings,weretheytomove(migrate)tothedestinationcountry.However,themigrantsfacetwotypesofcosts:(a)expensesassociatedwiththeactualcostsofthejourneyand(b)anon-monetarypsychiccost.Workersintheorigincountryobservetheequilibriumpriceofaworkpermitanddecidewhethertodemandoneaccordingly.Symmetrically, Tocalibratethemodel,weassumeafictitiousmarketintheUnitedStatesforMexicanworkers.WefirstestimatewhatearningsprospectivemigrantsfromMexicowouldearnintheUnitedStatesbyestimatingMincer-typeregressionsonUSsurveydataandinferringmigrantearningsusingthecharacteristics(age,education,etc.)ofaMexicanworker.Wefurtherdeflatetheseearningsbyapplyingawagetaxschedule andconvertpost-taxearningstotheirrealvaluesbydeflatingwiththeprevailingrelativepriceindices(Argente,Hsieh,andLee2023).Moreover,we usethestudiesofClemens,Montenegro,andPritchett Underourbaselinespecification,ourcalibrationsuggeststhatamarketforworkpermitswouldresultin33millionpermitsbeingexchangedatapriceclosetoUS$20,000.MigrantworkerswouldearnanaverageofUS$50,000peryear,thusincreasingfiscalrevenuesfortheUnitedStatesby5percent.Underthisscenario,permitsellerswouldnotonlygainintermsofleisure,butwouldexperienceanaveragenetincomegainofroughlyUS$10,000.Thisincreaseinincomeofnativepermitsellerswillreducethe reallocatingtheproceedsofthetaxtothesesamepermitsellersinalumpsum(unconditional)manner.Increasingthetax,whileremainingbelowthemonopolist’smarkup,wouldshrinkthesetofdirectbene-ficiariesofthemarketforworkpermitsandatthesametimeincreasetaxrevenuesandhencethesizeofthecashtransfermadeontopofthepermitprice.Wefindthat,giventhepriceelasticityofthedemandforworkpermits,taxpolicycanpotentiallyeradicatepovertyintheUnitedStates:a140percenttax,the Thereareantecedentstotheideaofamarket-basedimmigrationsystemproposedinthispaper.Forinstance,Chiswick(1982),BeckerandNashat(1997),andBeckerandLazear(2013)proposetoauc-tioncitizenshipasopposedtograntingitbasedonquotasandcumbersomerules.Similarly,AuriolandMe