经济危机后韩国经济增长结构性下滑的原因：聚焦企业投资渠道

Causesofthe Structural Decline inKorea’sEconomic GrowthFollowingEconomicCrises:Focusing on CorporateInvestment Channels Baek ChanginJuniorEconomist,Macro Forecasting& Research Team,ResearchDepartment,Bank of KoreaTel. 02-759-4150changinbaek@bok.or.kr Lee JongwoongSeniorEconomist,Macro Forecasting& Research Team,ResearchDepartment,Bank of KoreaTel. 02-759-4165jw.lee@bok.or.krBu YushinEconomist,Macro Forecasting &Research Team,ResearchDepartment,Bank of KoreaTel.02-759-4138yushin@bok.or.kr 1.Since the 1990s,Korea’s economic growthhas experiencedastructuralslowdown, failing toreturn to its pre-crisis trend afterundergoinga series ofeconomic crises. An analysis based onmacroeconomic data suggests thatthis resulted fromnegative demand shockstriggered bythesaidcrises,which led to a persistent slowdown in the growth trend through investmenthysteresis.* * Hysteresis refers to a phenomenon in whicha temporary shock has a negative effect on the long-runtrajectoryof economic variables (e.g., unemployment, investment). 2.To identify the causes of this investment hysteresis and explore possiblesolutions, an empiricalanalysis isconductedwithfirm-level microdata. An analysis of approximately 2,200externally auditedfirms showsthat, except for a small number of large corporations, investment among most firmsstagnatedor declinedaftertheGlobal FinancialCrisis.Furthermore, thisweakness in investmentappearsto be more closely associated with deteriorating profitability than with tighteningfinancial constraints. 3.Given thegreater impact ofdeteriorating profitabilityon thepost-crisis weakness in corporateinvestmentthan financial constraints,financial support alone may be insufficient to mitigatehysteresis.Instead, it is necessary to ensureon a fundamental levelthat thecleansing mechanism(cleansing effect)functions properly to allow the market exit of zombie firms,while alsofacilitating thesmooth entryofnew firms,so as toenhancethedynamismof theeconomy. 4.What would Korea’s investment and growth have been if the cleansing mechanism hadfunctionedeffectively? Usingthe characteristics of firms that actually exited the market, this paperidentifiesfirms at high risk ofexitand estimates that they accountedfor3.8 percentof the totalsamplebetween 2014 and 2019. In contrast, theactual exit ratewasonly2.0 percent, roughlyhalf the estimated share of high-exit-risk firms, indicating that the cleansing effectappears to havebeen limitedduring this period. Had these high-exit-risk firms exited the market and beenreplaced by viable firms within the industry,domestic investmentwould have been3.3 percent higherandGDP 0.5 percenthigheroverthe same period.During thepost-pandemic period (2022–2024),the share of high-risk firms (3.8 percent) remainedsimilar to that of the earlier period, but theactual exit ratefellfurther to0.4 percent. If these firms had beenreplaced successfully,investmentis estimated to have increased by2.8 percentandGDPby0.4 percent. 5.In sum, the post-crisis slowdown in Korea's economic growth stems primarily from weakinvestment driven by declining corporate profitability. This slowdown appears to have beenfurther exacerbated by the impairment of the economy's cleansing mechanism, which, had itfunctioned effectively, could have mitigated such weakness.Tomitigateand ultimately reversethedecline in the growth trend, it is essential that policy efforts prioritize the following: (1) Even whenfinancial supportis provided, itshould be designed tounderpinthe economy’sinnovativenessanddynamismby ensuring thesmooth entryandexitof firms. For example, financialsupportshouldseektoenhanceitseffectivenessbybeingselective and supplementaryin its application,targeting firms facing temporary liquidity difficultiesor innovative early-stage firms. (2)In addition,while maintainingKorea’stechnologicaladvantagein key industries,it is important tostrengthenthefuture growth enginesof the Korean economybystimulatinginvestmentinnew industriesthroughregulatory easingtocreatenew demand for products and services. ▪Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect theofficial views of the Bank of Korea. When reporting or citing this paper, the authors’names shouldbe always explicitly stated.▪Wewould like to express our appreciation toProfessor Lee Yoonsooof Sogang University,LeeJi-ho,DirectorGeneralof theResearch Departmentat the Bank of Korea,Kim Minsik,Directorof theMacroeconomic Forecasting Division,and Park Changhyeon,Head of the Macro Forecasting &Research Team,for their valuableadvice and comments. I. Background 1.Since the 1990s, Korea’s economic growth has exhibitedatrendofstructuralslowdownas theeconomy has passed through a series ofeconomiccrises.Following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis(AFC), the2008 Global Financial Crisis(GFC), and the 2020 pandemic, the economic growth rate hasdeclined step by step with each crisis episode. This structuralgrowthslowdownstands in clear contrastto the period