概述_A_友情链接

A curious balance Aftera turbulent 2025, the US enters 2026 in a curiousbalance ofsofteninglabor markets vs. stable growth, fallinginflation vs. easier fiscal policy, and broad-based demand vs.rising duration supply. The front end should rally as the Fedcuts, but long-term yields should remain elevated. Anshul Pradhan+1 212 412 3681anshul.pradhan@barclays.comBCI, US Demi Hu, CFA+1 212 526 7398demi.hu@barclays.comBCI, US Key Takeaways •In 2025, the administration's policies triggered significant volatility, with fears ranging from arecession to "Sell America," a fiscal crisis and threats to Fed independence. Ultimately, yieldsmoved lower across the curve, as fiscal concerns eased and labor marketssoftened.Despitepersistent commentary on fiscal indiscipline, the long end outperformed its global peers(Figure 1 and Figure 2). •We forecast2y, 5y, 10y, and 30y yields to end 2026 at 3.1%, 3.5%, 4.0%, and 4.7%,respectively, 40bp below forwards at the front end and 10bp at the long end (Figure 3). The2s30s Treasury curve should steepen to 160bp. Front-end yields should decline as the Fedcuts towards neutral and the market prices in a premium for more aggressive cuts. Termpremium compression at the long end due to falling inflation should beoffsetby lingeringfiscal uncertainty and heavy duration supply. •Risks to the outlook:Downside risks include a deeper Fed easing cycle if labor marketsweaken more sharply or the Fed reaction function turns decisively dovish, which would pullfront-end yields below 3% and accelerate bull steepening. Upside risks stem from renewedfiscal expansion ahead of midterms or heavier-than-expected long-end credit issuance, whichwould push 10y and 30y yields higher. Seasonals favor asell-offin February and rallies insummer. •Nominal GDP growthshould moderate over 2026, with real GDP growth near 2% andinflation falling towards the Fed's 2% target, pulling front-end yields lower. The outlook forpersonal income and consumption growth is modest and AI investments should boostgrowth, but less so than in 2025. Inflation progress should resume amid ongoing disinflationin core services and fadingtariffeffects.Annualized core PCE inflation will likely not be farabove the 2% target in H2 26. •The Fed's reaction functionwill be in focus with a new Fed chair, the Supreme Court rulingon Cook and Powell's potential departure in May. In addition, the rotation of Fed presidents Thisdocument is intended for institutional investors and is not subject to all of theindependence and disclosure standards applicable to debt research reports prepared for retailinvestors under U.S. FINRA Rule 2242. Barclays trades the securities covered in this report for itsown account and on a discretionary basis on behalf of certain clients. Such trading interestsmay be contrary to the recommendationsofferedin this report. Please see analyst certifications and important disclosures beginning on page 23.Completed: 01-Dec-25, 20:12 GMTReleased: 02-Dec-25, 12:00 GMTRestricted - External could also tilt the committee dovishly. With the outlook justifying cuts to neutral, one thing towatch is how the assessment of the neutral rate itself changes and whether that garnersenough support to cut below 3%. The Fed is likely to start expanding its balance sheet earlynext year via T-bills. •Fiscal concernshave eased astariffrevenues and lower issuance-weighted yieldsstrengthened the fiscal profile; this progress is at risk next year. Theeffectivetariffrate isrising very gradually and there is a possibility of new fiscal measures such as moreexemptions to addressaffordability,"tariffdividends" ahead of midterm elections or delaysin replacing IEEPAtariffs,if deemed illegal. •Fixed income supplyshould fall in the intermediate sector, led by a $470bn reduction in netissuance of Treasury notes/bonds to $1.2trn. Still, duration supply at the long end is likely torise, led by investment grade corporate bonds. Demand for US debt is likely to remain broad-based but price sensitive. Foreign investors should remain key buyers, domestic investorsshould extend duration for carry, and bank demand for USTs should pick up following SLRrelief. •TIPS:CPI inflation is likely to moderate over 2026 as thetariffeffectfades, with two-sidedrisks. Shelter inflation could fall more abruptly, given immigration constrains. On the otherhand, a new fiscal stimulus would likely delay the moderation in inflation to outer years. Thelabor market presents two-sided uncertainty. In supply, we expect the Treasury to hold TIPSauction sizes steady in 2026, while we think inflows into front-end TIPS funds will persist. •Funding conditionsare expected to improve in 2026 as QT ends and SOMA growth resumes,enabling Fed T-bill purchases to ease supply pressures. Persistent money fund inflows andexpanding GSIB balance sheet capacity should support normalization, while forthcomingGENIUS Act regulations and accelerating tokenization point to structural changes in marketinfra