缩小差距：税务管理绩效如何影响合规性（英）2025

Closing theGap: HowTaxAdministrationPerformanceShapesCompliance Katherine Baer, Patricio Barra,andJuan Carlos Benítez WP/25/209 IMF Working Papersdescribe research inprogress by the author(s) and are published toelicit commentsand to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers arethose of the author(s) and do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,or IMF management. 2025October IMF Working Paper Fiscal Affairs Department Closing theGap: HowTaxAdministrationPerformanceShapesCompliancePrepared byKatherine Baer, Patricio Barra, and Juan Carlos Benitez* Authorized for distribution byVitor GasparOctober2025 IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are publishedto elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT:This paper examines the impact of tax administration performance ontaxcompliancegapsacrosscountries. Building on the Allingham and Sandmo framework, weconsiderinstitutional effectiveness and thesocial acceptability of the tax system askeydeterminants of taxpayer behavior.We useanovel panel datasetofVAT gap estimates,results of standardized tax administration diagnostic assessments(TADAT), and taxadministration institutional and operational data (ISORA). We test the modelempirically by combining theHausman-Taylor and Mundlak-Krishnakumar frameworks.Our findings reveal a robust negative relationshipbetween tax administration effectiveness—based onTADAT scores—and VAT compliance gaps.We find thatan increasein a tax administration’s TADAT score from 1.85 to 2.32 (approximately D+ to C+) is associated withan0.6 percentage point increase in VAT revenue as a share of GDP,reflectingreducedVATnoncompliance.Includingspillover effects on Corporate Income Tax (CIT) compliance, the total revenue gaincouldreach 1.3percent of GDP.Wealsofind that higher social acceptability of the tax systemis linked tolowernoncompliance.These results underscore the critical role of strengtheninginstitutionstoimprovetax compliance andenhancetaxrevenue. RECOMMENDED CITATION:Baer, K., Barra, P., Benitez, J. C. (2025).Closing the gap: How taxadministration performance shapes compliance. IMF Working Paper, WP/25/209. International Monetary Fund,Washington, DC. Closing theGap: HowTaxAdministrationPerformanceShapesCompliance Prepared byKatherine Baer,Patricio Barra, andJuan Carlos Benitez Contents Glossary...............................................................................................................................................................4I. Introduction......................................................................................................................................................5II. Framework.......................................................................................................................................................7A.Theoretical Motivation.........................................................................................................................7B.The Model...........................................................................................................................................9III. Empirical Analysis.......................................................................................................................................10A.Data..................................................................................................................................................10B. Initial Data Inspection...............................................................................................................................15C. Estimation Model.....................................................................................................................................16D. Results.....................................................................................................................................................17E. Robustness Check...................................................................................................................................20F. Comparison with a Prior Analysis............................................................................................................21IV. Conclusions.................................................................................................................................................21Appendix I. Literature.......................................................................................................................................23Appendix II. Allingham and Sandmo (A-S) Tax Compliance Risk Theory...................................................25Appendix III. VAT Compliance Gap Estimates Based on the RA-GAP Reverse Method............................27Appendix IV. VAT-induced C