打破僵局：单一监管机构解除欧洲资本市场联盟的束缚（英）

25-18Breaking the deadlock A single supervisor to unshackle Europe’s Nicolas VéronAugust 2025 ABSTRACT The debate about a European Union single market for nonbank financial servicesgoes back decades. In recent years, the economic and strategic case for the idea,rebranded as capital markets union in 2014 and included in a broader conceptof savings and investments union in 2024, has strengthened. But progresstowards that goal has been embarrassingly modest. This working paper arguesthat supervisory integration—the pooling of capital market supervision at theEU level—is the only realistic option to create a foundation for the successful Nicolas Véronis seniorfellow at the PetersonInstitute for InternationalEconomics and the JEL codes:G23, G24, G28Keywords:Capital markets supervision, European Union, nonbank financial Note:An earlier version of this paper was published asBruegel Blueprint No. 35(June 2025). Since 2013, the author has been an independent nonexecutive director ofthe trade repository arm of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), whichincludes an entity (since 2019, DTCC Derivatives Repository Ireland) that ESMA directly 1 Introduction 1.1The longstanding goal of integrating capital markets The integration of Europe’s capital markets has been on the institutional agenda since at least1966, when the Segré Report on “The Development of a European Capital Market” waspublished by what was then the European Economic Community Commission. A year later,eminent financial historian Charles Kindleberger (1967, 657-658) summarized the report’sdiagnosis as follows: “Many of the faults in the functioning of domestic capital markets, and There have been many attempts to fix the faults. In 2014, then European CommissionPresident-Elect Jean-Claude Juncker coined the termcapital markets union(CMU) andshowcased it as a new policy project. Ten years later, the Commission rebranded the project asthesavings and investments union(SIU), an all-encompassing scheme that would supersedethe CMU and combine it with the banking union, a separate policy endeavor initiated in 2012. In March 2025, the Commission set out its reform strategy for capital markets for the 2024–29European parliamentary term, announcing, among other initiatives, that it would “makeproposals in Q4 2025 to achieve more unified supervision of capital markets . . . including by This paper retains the CMU label and focuses on the corresponding reform agenda.1It leavesaside other SIU building blocks, mainly matters related to banking and insurance policies.2 Most analysts and policymakers concur that the CMU project failed to deliver transformativeoutcomes in its first decade.3Most also argue that Europe’s need for better capital markets has never been greater.4Many experts and officials advocatesupervisory integration—that is,the further shifting of capital market supervision from the national to the European level.5 Views vary, however, on the importance of the supervisory integration theme in the reformagenda and on how to best implement integration (see, e.g., Bhatia et al. 2019; AFM and DNB2024; Draghi 2024; ESMA 2024b; Landais, Schnitzer et al. 2024; Letta 2024; Noyer 2024;Wyplosz 2024; Arampatzi et al. 2025).6 This paper takes as its starting point, but does not reiterate,the economic case for CMU. Thatcase, made by the above-cited contributions and many more, highlights the benefits forfunding corporate growth and investment that would result from improved capital allocationand capacity, as well as greater ability to absorb asymmetric shocks and thus to buttress EUresilience and financial stability. Instead of repeating these benefits, on which there is now The next subsection details the place of capital markets in the broader financial supervisorylandscape and the related semantics. Section 2 explains why, in the coming years, supervisoryintegration should be the dominant priority of the EU legislative plan for CMU, both because Section 3 describes the European Union’s current capital market supervisory landscape, anunwieldy and partly ineffective halfway house in which decision making is shared by the Section 4 looks at options for integrating capital market supervision and makes the case for aholistic rather than an ad hoc approach, going all the way to a single supervisor built on thebasis of ESMA. Rather than gradually transferring individual supervisory mandates to ESMAone by one without altering the supervisory system’s overall structure, the recommendation is Section 5 outlines the corresponding reform endpoint, which I refer to as a “multicentricESMA,” because its operations would be distributed across EU countries and it wouldaccommodate the probable lingering multiplicity of financial centers within the European The recommendation of a multicentric ESMA as a single supervisor may sound ambitious. Aprevious attempt to reinforce the governance of ESMA— the European SupervisoryAuthorities (ESAs) review propo