通货膨胀动态对货币政策策略的影响

Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.ISSN 1936-2854 (Print)ISSN 2767-3898 (Online) Implications of Inflation Dynamics for Monetary Policy Strategies Hess Chung, Callum Jones, Antoine Lepetit, Fernando M. Martin 2025-072 Please cite this paper as:Chung, Hess, Callum Jones, Antoine Lepetit, and Fernando M. Martin (2025).“Implica-tions of Inflation Dynamics for Monetary Policy Strategies,” Finance and Economics Dis-cussion Series 2025-072. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2025.072. NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminarymaterials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment.The analysis and conclusions set forthare those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or theBoard of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other thanacknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers. Implications of Inflation Dynamics for MonetaryPolicy Strategies Hess Chung, Callum Jones, Antoine Lepetit, Fernando M. Martin The analysis in this paper was presented to the Federal Open Market Committee as backgroundfor its discussion of the Federal Reserve’s 2025 review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, andcommunications. Abstract:This paper considers robust monetary policy strategies both in situations of lowdemand and low inflation and when economic developments pose a tradeoff between inflationand output stabilization. We proceed in two parts. First, our quantitative analysis suggests thatasymmetric average inflation targeting can provide modest benefits over other inflation-targetingstrategies when the risks associated with the effective lower bound remain significant. Second,motivated by the recent experience of persistent supply shocks and rapid increases in inflation,we describe the main qualitative features of optimal policy in circumstances when the objectivesof stabilizing inflation and economic activity conflict. We find that monetary policy may allowinflation to depart from the target in response to certain supply shocks or in cases when sectoraldynamics are relevant, but that it should be ready to respond forcefully and expeditiously to largeinflationary shocks or if inflation expectations are at risk of becoming unanchored. JEL Classification:E31, E52, E58. Keywords:Alternative monetary policy strategies, monetary policy communication, effectivelower bound, supply shocks, sectoral dynamics, inflation surges. 1. Introduction and overview Starting in the 1990s, an increasing number of central banks around the world adoptedinflation-targeting strategies. Under these strategies, central banks set an explicit inflation targetto help deliver low and stable inflation. Under “flexible” inflation targeting, central banksbalance medium-run inflation stabilization against other objectives, including stabilizingeconomic activity or employment. The Federal Reserve adopted flexible inflation targeting in2012, with the announcement of a 2 percent longer-run inflation objective in its first Statementon Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy. Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, inflation targeting had generally performed well,although it was well understood that the effective lower bound (ELB) on nominal interest ratesposed challenges to these strategies as conventionally pursued.1 The difficulty of providingsufficient accommodation when the policy rate is constrained by the ELB was readily apparentduring the protracted recovery from the Great Recession. In response, many central banksemployed unconventional policy instruments, such as balance sheet policies and forwardguidance to provide additional policy accommodation. In the U.S., the decade following the Great Recession was characterized by below-targetinflation, low nominal interest rates, concern about future binding ELB episodes, and the riskthat longer-term inflation expectations might drift downwards. In light of these experiences andin line with the practices of other major central banks, the Federal Reserve conducted the firstreview of its monetary policy framework in 2019-20 to assess whether changes in its monetarypolicy strategy could improve outcomes when the federal funds rate is at risk of beingconstrained by the ELB. A key outcome of that review was the adoption of a new element in its2020 Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy: In order to achieve2 percent inflation on average over time, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) would“likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time” in situations whereinflation had been running persistently below 2 percent. This strategy shares some similaritieswith an asymmetric variant of flexible average inflation targeting, a class of strategies underwhich the central bank aims to stabilize a