全球化2.0时代？（英）2025

rom the fall of the Soviet Union to the 2016 election ofPresident Donald Trump, America rode the globalizationhorse, leading the charge for the near-complete globalintegration of finance, investment, and trade. In thisutopia, economic borders would be a thing of the past,capital would find its most efficient use anywhere aroundthe world, and the globe would be awash with win-winoutcomes. Sure, some workers might get hurt, but theycould move frictionlessly to thriving communities and “learn to code.” It was This time withoutthe mistakes? America’s destined role to lead the world to this brighter place. Those whodidn’t embrace that view were, well, beyond the pale and accused of beingignorant of basic economic principles.It is easy to look back with incredulity and for some, even disdain, but this would forget the heady days after the long Cold War, and the belief in,as former U.S. State Department official Francis Fukuyama called it, “theend of history.” Or as former Intel CEO Craig Barrett stated, “Capitalism haswon and economy trumps all going forward.” With the exception of a fewmalcontents, who didn’t agree? Indeed, it was, and for many still is, a simple,seductive, and sublime conception.Needless to say, that vision didn’t work out quite the way its advocates believed or promised. The rise of an array of “behind the border” trade re-strictions, many unchallengeable in the World Trade Organization system,was unexpected for many, as was the recalcitrance of many leading nations,especially in the “global South” and led by India, toward getting fully onboard. But most important was the rise of China, a country that willfully Indeed, in their zeal to turn back the clock to 2016,many deny any and all problems from trade. U.S. manu-facturing? It’s healthier than ever and anyone who doesn’tagree is protectionist, or even worse, racist, according to skirted global trade rules in the 2000s and abandoned andflouted them by the 2010s.And so, the political economy of trade in the United States, but also in many OECD nations, shifted from one ofutopian optimism to almost dystopian despair. Domesticallywe have gone from America the leader to America alone. Itdidn’t matter which party was in power. The first Trumpadministration opposed market opening, signaled by itsday-one abandonment of the Transpacific Partnership tradeagreement. But so did the Biden administration, with its“pause” on new trade agreements (a euphemism for ban),its pulling the United States out of the WTO Joint StatementInitiative on e-commerce, and its embrace of Buy Americaand other protectionist measures. Now the second Trumpadministration promises to go all in on autarky, with across-the-board tariffs on friends and foes alike.At one level, it could be expected that the response to The globalization vision didn’t work out quite the way its advocates believed or promised. the failures of Globalization 1.0 would be a Hegelian antith-esis. If Globalization 1.0 was bad, domestic autarky, protec-tionism, and America alone was the unfortunate response.But America can and should do better than reaction and Peterson Institute head Adam Posen. Loss of millions ofmanufacturing jobs? Don’t worry, it’s all the machines’fault, don’t blame trade. Middle class economic anxiety?Don’t blame globalization, blame automation and lack ofadequate worker education. Hollowing out of the defense-industrial base? Don’t worry, we have artificial intelligence.Voters turning against globalization? It’s their fault for be-ing nativists and being stirred up by protectionist dema-gogues. Losing our lead in advanced industries to China?No way, China can’t innovate and we have Silicon Valley.But be sure to give workers that have lost because of tradea bit more money and training.Denialof reality and incorrect interpretations of rejection. Pundits, analysts, advocates, and policymakers cannow acknowledge that we have spent enough time in a coun-terproductive globalization rejection phase, and it’s time toabandon the road to autarky. The problem, of course, is thateven in Globalization 1.0 there were still significant contin-gents on the right and the left that fundamentally rejected andeven despised globalization, at least corporate-led globaliza-tion. The stumbles and falls of Globalization 1.0 created anopening for their autarkic vision. data might delay the full realization of the bankruptcy ofGlobalization 1.0, but not for long. Trump’s reelectionshould have made that obvious. So rather than engage ina rear-guard denial of the problems, advocates of global-ization should understand that something actually wentwrong—that the unwashed masses may actually be on tosomething—and begin to work for a better version of glo-balization, something beyond simply expanded trade ad-justment assistance for the “losers.” DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 1.0 The reality is that Globalization 1.0 cannot be resurrected.Yet many advocates of globalization and free trade contin-ue to embra