人力资本与英国生产力停滞

By Aditya Goenka and Lin Liu Over the past two decades, the United Kingdom has persistently underperformed onproductivity, with GDP per hour worked growing by just 0.6 per cent per annum between2007 and 2019 — below the OECD average of 1.2 per cent. This ‘productivity puzzle’ hasprofound implications for living standards, fiscal sustainability, and global competitiveness.Human capital encompassing the knowledge, skills, and health of the workforce, is widelyrecognized as a key driver of productivity: a healthier, better-educated workforce generatesgreater innovation, adapts more rapidly to technological change, and sustains higher outputper worker. The relative decline in UK human capital — specifically in higher-educationenrolment and health outcomes — accounts for a substantial share of its productivityshortfall. The role of education and health in productivity is well documented in the literature(Lucas, 1988). It contributes both to the quantity and quality of labour input. A moreeducated workforce tends to be more adaptable, innovative, and productive (Acemogluand Autor, 2011). Simultaneously, better health enhances both labour force participationand work efficiency. Studies in macroeconomics and labour economics suggest that bothfactors contribute directly and indirectly to total factor productivity (TFP), making themindispensable components of long-term growth (Barro, 2001; Jones (2014). The educationand health deficits may be contributing to the United Kingdom’s productivity lag comparedto OECD peers. Trends in Productivity From 2000 to 2007, UK labour productivity tracked the OECD mean; post-2008, UKgrowth slowed dramatically (0.3 per cent per annum vs. the OECD average of 1.5 per centas shown in figure C1). Growth accounting attributes 40 per cent of the UK productivityslowdown since 2008 to TFP weakness, 25 per cent to capital, and 35 per cent to a flatliningin labour-quality growth. The gap in productivity levels has widened steadily, positioningthe UK amongst the weaker performers in the G7 and OECD. Thisdivergenceunderscorestheneedtolookbeyondtraditionalinputslikecapitalinvestmentand focus more closely on labour quality. The United Kingdom’s underperformance isespecially stark when benchmarked against high-performing OECD countries such asGermany, Sweden, and Japan, which have maintained more consistent investment in botheducation and public health. Education and Productivity The UK share of 18–21-year-olds in higher education rose from 40 per cent in 2000 to50per cent in 2010, then plateaued at around 55 per cent, while the OECD averagecontinues to climb to 65 per cent in 2020. This stagnation is mirrored by below-averagereturns to education; UK estimates of the Mincer (1974) coefficient, which gives the returnsto an additional year of schooling, are around 0.08, below the OECD median of 0.10. Thisindicates a weaker utilisation of educational skills in the workplace. The relationship between human capital and productivity depends not just on accessto education but also on quality and labour market alignment. Research has shown thatcognitive skills – rather than mere years of schooling—are a better predictor of cross-country productivity differences (Hanushek and Woessmann). This makes it essential toevaluate whether UK higher education is adequately equipping students with relevantskills for a changing labour market. The relatively flat rate of higher education expansion since 2010 reflects both demographicchanges and policy constraints, including the introduction of student fees, rise in studentdebt, and limited growth in non-university vocational pathways. The plateau suggests theUnited Kingdom may be nearing a participation ceiling under current models, necessitatingreforms to funding, flexibility, and employer engagement. Source: OECD. Foreign student enrolment has grown by about 70 per cent since 2010. As the homestudent fees have remained essentially the same in nominal terms since their introduction,the foreign fees (£12.1 billion in 2024) act like a subsidy to providers of higher educationof about 23 per cent (Bolton et al., 2025). The proposed changes of the introduction of aforeign-student surcharge, work-visa programme, and extension of period for naturalizationas citizens, will deter foreign students. By weakening the higher education institutions,effects will eventually be felt by domestic students and further dampen productivity. Health and Productivity Health outcomes have similarly fallen behind. UK life expectancy at birth in 2022 was81.2 years, below the OECD average of 82.9 (figure C3). Self-reported ill health is alsohigher: 15 per cent of UK adults report chronic health conditions, compared to 12 per centacross the OECD. More strikingly, 9 per cent of working-age UK adults receive sickness ordisability benefits—nearly double the OECD average. There is a growing bodyofevidence linking improved population health to labourproductivityand economic growth (Weil, 2