参议院小企业和创业委员会的证词

34Ibid. 12 It's impossible to condense volumes of research into five minutes but here are the basics: Chinauses three types of transfer practices: legal, illegal, and extralegal—the last category so namedbecause they occur without supervision and their legality is unknown.Illegal transfers run from insider operations, patent infringement, and reverse engineering to thehacking and clandestine exploits we read about in the press. China tech espionage cases are sonumerous that ODNI issues two annual reports: one on China, and one on the rest of the world.Noteworthy examples include next-generation battery technology, composites for jet engines,and self-driving technology.Legal transfers done through China-based U.S. subsidiaries, start-up accelerators, targeted hires,direct and indirect investment, mergers and acquisitions, and tech-for-trade agreements are easyto spot but hard to counter because U.S. participants and oversight officials often confuse “legal”with “in the U.S. interest.”Finally, there are a dozencategoriesof “extralegal” venues that China uses, including frontorganizations for deniability, paid short-term visits to state debriefing centers, overseas technicalsupport guilds, online recruiting and, of course, China’s human talent recruitment programs.In a 2023 book on artificial intelligence5we gave examples of U.S. tech firms in China, such asMicrosoft, Intel, and IBM, working with China on AI development and credited by alumni of theprograms as critical to China’s success. In the same book, we named tentypesof venues used toeffect transfers from foreign academics, such as school-to-school “partnerships,” co-authorship,and a practice called “using foreigners to draw in foreigners” (以洋引洋).These practices threaten U.S. businesses large and small. The latter are especially vulnerableowing to a scarcity of research funds and investment capital, shrinking talent pools, feweropportunities to commercialize breakthroughs, inadequate due diligence, and limited venues forredress. The impact on our proprietary technology, while not quantifiable, is obvious from theimportance China attaches to this exploitative enterprise—acknowledged by Chinese scientists,policymakers, and business entrepreneurs.So, what can be done? First, we must appreciate that the reason this is a problem at all isbecause our lead has shrunk to the point where theft matters, whereas before we were so farahead it didn’t matter. Rebuilding U.S. research, entrepreneurship and productive capacity—independently of whatever China is doing or stealing—is the only sure way out.Meanwhile, we propose five commonsense measures.6They are:5William C. Hannas and Huey-Meei Chang, eds.,Chinese Power and Artificial Intelligence, (New York andLondon: Routledge, 2023).6See William C. Hannas and Huey-Meei Chang, “Unwanted Foreign Transfers of U.S. Technology: ProposedPrevention Strategies.” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 10, 2021, for a more completelist. https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/unwanted-foreign-transfers-of-u-s-technology-proposed-prevention-strategies/. 1. Data on China’s transfer practices should be gathered and shared with U.S. firms andacademic compliance offices. Persistent, dedicated efforts are needed to track China’s activitiesas they evolve and change to evade the sunlight.2. Clear guidelines on what is legally permissible should be communicated to foreign actorscontemplating research in the United States, and to U.S. persons doing business in China.3. Members of China’s overseas support guilds, talent recruitment programs, lobbying groups,and other United Front operatives should register as foreign agents.4. Recipients of U.S. government funding should report contacts with or travel to China tominimize China’s ability to benefit from U.S. federal and state-level investment.5. Finally, there are opportunities for U.S. authorities to stand China’s transfer apparatus on itshead by seeding these venues with persons disposed to support U.S. interests.We are past the point where this problem can be ignored. The gap between tech breakthroughsand consequences is measured now in weeks, which puts a premium on keeping what we invent.Thank you for the opportunity to address this important issue.Wm. C. HannasProfessorGeorgetown University